Past research on morality has emphasized a single justice-based moral ethic. Expanding this conception of morality, Shweder has proposed a universal taxonomy of three moral rhetorics related to justice, interdependence, and purity. Five studies tested the hypothesis that American morality emphasizes the justice-based rhetoric, whereas Filipino morality is represented by all three rhetorics. In the first three studies, American examples were modally justice based, whereas Filipinos generated examples in approximately equal proportions from each rhetoric. In Study 4, Americans rated justice-based rules higher on criteria of morality than rules from other rhetorics; Filipinos rated rules from all three rhetorics as moral. In Study 5, the association between anger and moral violations was stronger for Americans than for Filipinos, consistent with American emphasis on the moral stature of justice. Discussion focused on the origins and consequences of the American emphasis on rights and the balanced representation of morality observed in Filipinos.

CULTURAL VARIATION AND
SIMILARITY IN MORAL RHETORICS
Voices From the Philippines and the United States

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The study of culture has invigorated social psychology in many ways. Many phenomena previously considered universal features of human social life have been shown to be culturally specific for theoretically interesting reasons. The fundamental attribution error, for example, is not so fundamental, due to cultural differences in construals of causality and the self (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). Emotional experience varies in content and dynamic properties because of cultural differences in self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In these and other studies (e.g., Fiske, 1992), cultural variation in social phenomena leads researchers to investigate how culture, reflected in proximal processes such as context and self-construal, influences social perception and behavior. The study of culture, in this sense, is a continuation of social psychology's longstanding credos that context and subjective interpretation influence social behavior (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 1991).

The study of culture has similarly expanded the study of morality in theoretically significant ways (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder,

Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Recent studies of morality in different cultures have helped refine definitions of moral concepts, expand and clarify basic conceptions within the field, and illuminate how members of cultures perceive standards to be moral.

In the present investigation, we pursued three aims in examining cultural differences in morality in the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. First, it was of interest to provide validation evidence relevant to Shweder's new model of morality, which expands on previous definitions of morality to include principles contained within three moral rhetorics that are important in non-Western cultures. Second, based on characterizations of the social order in the United States and the Philippines, we tested culture-specific hypotheses about likely variations in which moral rhetorics members of the two cultures would emphasize. Specifically, analyses of the two cultures led us to predict that American conceptions of morality would focus on a single set of moral issues centered around themes of harm and personal rights, whereas Filipinos, because of their social and political heritage, would conceptualize morality in the language and concepts of all three rhetorics. Third, given the burgeoning interest in morality and emotion, we explored connections between the three moral rhetorics and emotion.

TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF MORALITY

Past research into moral development, pioneered by Kohlberg (1971, 1981), has posited that morality is restricted to a set of issues revolving around justice and individual rights. This research has considered only judgments that are universally generalizable to be moral. For a given principle to be moral, it must be seen as a mandatory guideline and constraint for all persons in all relevant situations. According to the Western philosophical tradition (e.g., Kant, Mill, Locke, Rawls), only the individual and his or her rights are universally generalizable, and thus only issues pertaining to preservation of the individual's rights, such as protection from harm, preservation of freedom, enforcement of social contracts, and just rewards and punishments, can be considered true moral principles. Thus, Kohlberg (1981) says, "[moral principles] reduce all moral obligations to the interests and claims of concrete individuals in concrete situations. . . . [It] is clear that only principles of justice have an ultimate claim to being adequate universal, prescriptive principles" (p. 175).

Based on this formulation, researchers have presented moral dilemmas related to harm, rights, and justice to members of societies around the world and documented the reasoning that people used to make decisions to resolve such moral dilemmas (see Snarey, 1985, for a review). Such research has indeed demonstrated that issues of harm, rights, and justice are relevant to many diverse peoples: in North, Central, and South America; in Europe, Africa, and Asia, studies have found that when asked to reason about moral dilemmas within this set of issues, people are able to make judgments that are interpretable to these researchers as reflecting appropriate justice-based moral reasoning.

What of social principles that do not meet the Kohlbergian criterion for morality? Rules that govern social behavior but that presumably do not revolve around harm, rights, or justice have been considered social conventions, which are believed to differ qualitatively from moral rules (Turiel, 1983). If moral principles are universal, obligatory, and independent of social context, then social conventions are contextual and arbitrary. Social conventions can be powerful guides for behavior, but nonetheless derive their power from consensus, not from a universal principle.

CHALLENGES TO A RIGHTS-BASED CONCEPTION OF MORALITY

Evidence suggests that a justice-based moral code does not fully describe the moral concerns of people everywhere. First, in collectivist societies, the group and its relationships, not Kohlberg's "concrete individual in concrete situations," may be the more appropriate unit of analysis (Nakane, 1970; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). If so, it is plausible that concerns other than individual rights might guide moral reasoning in such societies. Consistent with this notion, interpersonal responsibilities and caring for others are imbued with full moral status for some people and cultures, and not seen only as social conventions or as subsets of the justice-based moral system (e.g., Dien, 1983; Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978; Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Miller et al., 1990; Nisan, 1987; Reid, 1990; Snarey, 1985). Second, one study found that harmless but disgusting or disrespectful actions were viewed as morally offensive by members of some cultures, and merely as conventional violations in others (Haidt et al., 1993). Third, moral reasoning that derives from non-Western philosophical, spiritual, and religious traditions may impart full moral status on orientations toward behavior dealing with the unity of all life and sacred aspects of living (Gielen & Kelly, 1983; Vasudev, 1981, cited in Snarey, 1985). Just as Western cultures assert that a justice-based morality is universally generalizable, these other emphases in moral reasoning are seen as universally generalizable to the people and cultures that endorse them.

THREE UNIVERSAL MORAL RHETORICS

To integrate diverse moral concepts across cultures, Shweder and colleagues (1997) have advanced the proposition that morality can be described by three moral discourses or *rhetorics*, which derive from Shweder's work on self-construal in the United States and India. Shweder has found that the Western view of the self as a bounded, independent entity is not shared by people in India, where the self is viewed as an interconnected part of the social and natural world (Shweder & Bourne, 1982). If the self is not perceived as a bounded individual in all cultures, then relying on the individual as a unit of analysis for determining the moral status of social principles is not a valid premise, and conceptions of morality must be appropriately expanded.

The first of Shweder's rhetorics preserves the central concepts in the view of morality based on Western philosophy. The "ethics of Autonomy" relies on concepts such as harm, rights, and justice and is focused on the protection of the individual's rights and freedom to pursue his or her own preferences. The second moral rhetoric is comprised of the "ethics of Community," which incorporates the themes of duty, status, hierarchy, and interdependence. The goal is to protect the network of social roles and relationships, with the self viewed as an "office holder" in the greater community. Here one sees the focus on interpersonal relationships and caring that has been most frequently cited as an omission from Kohlbergian moral development coding (Snarey, 1985). The third moral rhetoric involves the "ethics of Divinity," which contains themes such as the "natural order," sin, sanctity, and pollution. The goal of these regulations is to protect the human spirit from degradation, and the self is seen as connected to a sacred whole.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE THREE MORAL RHETORICS

To date, empirical studies of Shweder's three rhetorics are few in number and limited by certain design features that motivated the present series of studies. Shweder validated his

taxonomy by conducting interviews with 49 inhabitants of Bhunaneswar, India (Shweder et al., 1997). The informants evaluated 39 potential breaches of codes of conduct relevant to life in that community, such as "In a family, a twenty-five-year-old son addresses his father by his first name." In coding the reasons that informants gave for evaluating the conduct of the protagonists in the story, Shweder and colleagues found themes from the ethical discourses of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity.

The seeds of the three rhetorics are also seen in a study by Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1990), which presented the same 39 breaches to children and adults in India and the United States. Of particular relevance to the current question is the fact that American and Indian respondents agreed that a subset of actions involving harm were wrong (ignoring an accident victim, kicking an animal, stealing) but were in considerable disagreement when the principle of individual rights was opposed by issues of hierarchy or purity. For instance, Indians in the Brahman caste found it morally acceptable for a husband to beat a disobedient wife and morally objectionable for a wife to eat with her husband's elder brother, whereas American respondents reported the opposite evaluations.

In an investigation developed in parallel with Shweder's analysis and that lends support to Shweder's model, Haidt and colleagues (1993) explored the moral status of disrespectful and disgusting actions in two cultures. Participants in the United States and in Brazil of varying socioeconomic statuses and ages were presented with violations of codes of conduct. Some breaches did not violate rights or involve physical harm, but were instead disrespectful, analogous to Community, and disgusting, analogous to Divinity. Examples of such violations used in this study are stories of a woman who uses the flag of her country to clean her toilet, or a man who buys a chicken at the market, has sexual intercourse with it, then cooks and eats it. Upper-class participants from all cultures found these actions to be harmless and thus not moral violations; people of lower socioeconomic status, particularly in collectivist societies, viewed the actions as morally offensive. Thus, violations of standards outside the ethics of Autonomy were seen as moral violations in some cultures.

Other researchers have not studied these three rhetorics directly, but have obtained findings consistent with the idea that standards outside of the ethics of Autonomy may be seen as fully principled moral codes. For example, Miller and colleagues (Miller & Bersoff, 1992, 1994; Miller et al., 1990) have found that in India, interpersonal obligations and reciprocity concerns are perceived to have the type of moral status reserved in America for issues of harm, rights, and justice.

Although promising, this body of evidence is limited in important ways. First, there have been few studies that directly examined the content and cultural variation in the three rhetorics. Shweder's system is more often invoked in post hoc fashion to explain observed cultural differences. Second, researchers have followed the methods of earlier work on moral development by constructing their own examples of transgressions of codes of conduct and having participants evaluate or classify them. There has been little exploration of the content of the moral rhetorics themselves and no study to our knowledge that examined the content of the three rhetorics from the participant's perspective in the United States or other cultures. Third, because of the methods chosen, researchers have been able to focus only on transgressions rather than positive rules from these three rhetorics. The present investigation was designed to address these concerns.

MORALITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE PHILIPPINES

The central hypothesis tested in the present investigation is that the rhetoric of Autonomy guides moral thought in the United States but that all three rhetorics guide moral thought in the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines has a uniquely multicultural heritage and history emphasizing themes from each of Shweder's rhetorics. First, in the Philippines there is a strong focus on interconnectedness and social networks, far exceeding the typical experience of Americans (Steinberg, 1990). Research by Filipino and foreign psychologists has identified central values and traits that are relevant to the moral rhetorics described above and that do not translate easily into single English terms, such as *pakikisama* (smooth interpersonal relationships), *walang hiya* (to be without appropriate shame; insensitive and thoughtless to others), and *utang na loob* (a debt of gratitude or reciprocity of obligation) (Church, 1987; Lapuz, 1978; Steinberg, 1990). Smooth interpersonal relations and family harmony are seen as extremely important aspects of Filipino life (Church, 1987). These central values—family integrity, the self defined in in-group terms, harmony, behavior regulated by in-group norms—demonstrate that the Philippines can be classified as a collectivist society (Triandis et al., 1990) and emphasize the role of Community considerations in the Filipino culture. Second, the Philippines represents itself as Catholic society, and doctrine of the Church is heavily intertwined in daily life and culture (*Area Handbook of the Philippines*, 1995; Gowing, 1979). The religious emphasis may lead to elaboration of some moral standards related to the ethics of Divinity, particularly regarding sexual purity. Third, the Filipino colonial experience under Spain and the United States has imparted a strong Western influence in the country compared with its nearest geographical neighbors in Asia. Such an influence would be expected to promote issues related to the ethics of Autonomy. In sum, cultural and historical forces suggest that Filipino conceptions of morality will contain a blend of all three of Shweder's rhetorics, perhaps unlike American conceptions.

THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION

In the present study, we relied on a variety of methods to explore the content of Shweder's three moral rhetorics in the United States and in the Philippines. We tested three general hypotheses. Our first interest was to compare the content of morality across two cultures that construe the self and the social order in much different ways. Following a logic that has motivated other cross-cultural comparisons (e.g., Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Morris & Peng, 1994), we expected that in the United States the rhetoric of Autonomy and its emphasis on justice, rights, and harm would be the predominant moral language, whereas in the Philippines, moral reasoning would be couched in all three rhetorics. Second, we expected that in the United States, moral rules from the ethics of Autonomy would be seen as the most important and most "moral" according to established criteria, whereas in the Philippines, rules from all three rhetorics would be seen as important and moral. Finally, based on arguments that we detail in a section that follows, we expected certain emotions to be associated with violations of the three rhetorics across the two cultures and that the association between anger and Autonomy violations would be strongest in the United States.

STUDY 1: MORAL RULES

The purpose of Study 1 was to describe the contents of Shweder's three moral rhetorics. Whereas in all previous studies researchers used their own examples of moral violations, we presented descriptions of each of the rhetorics to participants and asked them to describe in their own words rules of behavior within each rhetoric. After a pilot test in the United States indicated that people could generate intelligible responses when prompted by our instructions, we set out to assess the rules comprising each of the moral rhetorics at the University of Wisconsin at Madison and the University of the Philippines at Diliman. Our hypothesis in this study was that Americans would show a strong emphasis on Autonomy themes in their description of moral rules, whereas Filipinos would emphasize rules from all three rhetorics to equal degrees.

METHOD

Participants

Fifty undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of Wisconsin and 43 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of the Philippines participated in this task in sessions lasting less than 30 minutes. Participants at both universities were relatively affluent young adults (ages 18-24) and were chiefly composed of the ethnic majority in each culture (i.e., Caucasian in the United States, Tagalog in the Philippines). Students received extra credit for participation.

Materials

Participants were presented with a three-page questionnaire. At the top of each page of the questionnaire was a description of one of the three moral rhetorics, described as a "category" and labeled Autonomy, Community, or Purity (Purity was used as a synonym for Divinity). The categories, or rhetorics, were presented in one of three orders. Underneath each description of the rhetorics were eight thought-listing boxes. Participants were instructed to think of as many rules of behavior relating to each category and to write one example in each box. Descriptions of the categories are shown below:

> Sometimes our impressions of others are based on a category called "Autonomy." Autonomy has to do with ideas of harm, rights, justice, and freedom. It also includes ideas about equality and fairness. A major theme of this category is protecting the freedom and choices of people in society, and making sure everyone is treated fairly.

> Sometimes our impressions of others are based on a category called "Community." Community has to do with ideas of duty, status, social hierarchy, and interdependence. It includes rules about how people should behave when they are members of a group, and the duties or responsibilities a person has toward others in the group. A major theme of this category is protecting the social order and the network of relationships within the group.

> Sometimes our impressions of others are based on a category called "Purity." Purity has to do with ideas about cleanliness, the "natural order," sin, and pollution. It includes rules about the way people should think, feel, or behave in order to be clean of body and spirit. A major theme in this category is protecting a person's body and soul from degradation.

Procedure

Participants were seated far enough apart to ensure privacy. The purpose of the study was described as a means of investigating the types of rules people use when they form impressions of other people. The participants were asked to read carefully the description of the three categories of thought that they would find on the top of each page of the questionnaire and to think of rules that they used to make judgments of others that were related to each category. They were advised to think of rules as statements that begin "People should . . . " or "People should not . . . " Participants were given 8 minutes to think of examples of rules for each category, to ensure that participants devoted equal attention to each moral rhetoric. They were asked to work only on the page in front of them until the experimenter told them to turn to the next page. Participants in the Philippines received instructions in both Tagalog and English and were instructed to answer in whatever language they felt most comfortable.

Coding. A coding protocol was developed using the responses from the smaller pilot study mentioned above ($N = 45$). The pilot study was conducted according to the same procedure as the current study, but was run only in the United States. Initial coding classifications were proposed based on the rhetorics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, and participant data that could not be assigned a category were discussed by a team of three coders to determine whether additional categories were needed or whether existing categories should be revised.

The coding protocol was then augmented in the current study through sample coding of approximately 20 responses from each country. New items were added from the Philippines data, chiefly representing themes of harmonious relationships and religious beliefs that did not occur in the United States pilot data. The pilot protocol was thus revised to include these themes and to attempt to provide a comparable breadth of category among the coding categories. For instance, it was determined that several classifications related to "being open-minded" in the pilot data were more specific than the newly added classifications for religious beliefs, and so were combined into a single code. At this point, the coding system was closed to revision for the current study.

Thought-listings were compiled into one large list for both countries. Four coders assigned the participant data to the 46 coding classes: 14 from Autonomy, 16 from Community, and 16 from Divinity (see the appendix for a list of coding classes). Separate coding classes were maintained for items that did not contain guidelines about behavior and thus were not considered "rules" for purposes of coding[1] and those that did qualify as rules but could not be captured by the coding system (e.g., items containing themes of sexual perversion, which was added as a coding class in the second and third studies). Agreement among the four coders exceeded 90% and did not differ by the rhetoric of the response. Each coder coded participant responses from each country. The coding protocol instructed that rules should be assigned to the most appropriate coding category, regardless of the rhetoric assigned to the participant. Translation from Tagalog, when necessary, was done by University of the Philippines graduate students, although almost all responses were in English.

We also coded for the presence or absence of four specific themes related to each moral rhetoric, as a way of assessing the degree to which a particular moral rhetoric infused the other categories. That is, as we predicted that Autonomy was a driving force for American respondents, we coded for the explicit mention of freedom, harm, rights, or justice in all responses. Although we expected to see a relatively high level of those themes when the task was to write about Autonomy, we wondered to what degree the same words would show up in

TABLE 1
Classification of Moral Rules: Study 1

	United States				Republic of the Philippines			
	Autonomy	*Community*	*Divinity*	p <	*Autonomy*	*Community*	*Divinity*	p <
Percentage of rules in each rhetoric	47	31	23	.001	35	33	33	.777
Percentage of category-appropriate rules	87	70	57	.001	67	73	74	.276
Percentage of rules infused with themes from each rhetoric	24	21	10	.001	18	25	12	.004

American descriptions of Community and Divinity. Similarly, we coded for explicit mention of status, rights, hierarchy, or interdependence as Community themes, and for mention or pure body, spirit, thoughts, or behavior for Divinity themes.

There were 1,044 potential rules listed by American participants and 638 rules generated by Filipino students. Of these rules, in the United States, 16.5% were excluded as not meeting the criteria to be rules, and 7.6% were excluded as not classifiable; in the Philippines, 8.0% were excluded as not meeting the criteria to be rules, and 9.6% were excluded as not classifiable, leaving analyses to be performed on 737 rules in the United States and 526 rules in the Philippines.

Verification of Rule Categories

A second American sample ($N = 42$) sorted the rules from our coding system into five possible categories: the rhetorics of Autonomy, Community, Divinity, defined for the participants; a definitive vote for none of the rhetorics, or a vote of "I don't know where to put this rule." The "none" and "don't know" categories received negligible mention. The generalized rules were sorted back into their presumed theoretical rhetoric at rates highly exceeding chance, $\chi^2 (4) = 1,140.22, p < .001$. On an individual rule level, 95% of the rules were classified back into their theoretical rhetorics; subsequent analyses were performed excluding the rules that the verification sample classified as belonging to a different rhetoric than we believed appropriate, and no differences in key findings were obtained.

RESULTS

Our general hypothesis that America emphasizes Autonomy-based morality whereas the Philippines represents morality in all three rhetorics led to three specific predictions. First, we expected that Americans would generate more Autonomy-related moral rules than rules related to the other two rhetorics and than Filipinos would generate. Second, we expected Americans to have greater facility in generating rules from the Autonomy rhetoric than the other rhetorics, whereas Filipinos would demonstrate equal facility in generating rules from the three rhetorics. Third, we expected Autonomy-related themes to infuse Americans' descriptions of moral rules from all three rhetorics. We tested these hypotheses by analyzing

(a) the percentage of all responses coded into each of the moral rhetorics, (b) the percentage of responses that were coded as belonging to the rhetoric the participant had been assigned, and (c) the percentage of all responses that explicitly mentioned the specific themes of each rhetoric.

Given the nature of the timed task, one would expect roughly equal proportions of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity examples within each culture, unless one of the rhetorics strongly dominates moral thought within a culture. The latter pattern of emphasis is seen in the U.S. profile in Table 1, which presents the percentages of participant responses coded into each moral rhetoric and the results of the statistical tests of our three hypotheses. Consistent with our first prediction, despite the equal time given the three rhetorics, Americans generated significantly more examples of Autonomy (47% of responses) than the other rhetorics (31% of responses coded as Community, 23% as Divinity). Consistent with our second prediction, Americans did far better at generating Autonomy examples, when asked, than they did when asked to give Community or Divinity examples. That is, 87% of responses in the assigned category of Autonomy were coded as Autonomy; for Community, 70% of responses were coded into the assigned category, and for Divinity, only 57% of responses were coded into the assigned category. And consistent with our third prediction, specific themes from Autonomy, namely, rights, harm, justice, and freedom, "infused" (i.e., were present in) 24% of American respondents' descriptions of moral rules, more often than the other themes.

In contrast, Filipino respondents generated examples from the three rhetorics at the level we would expect from the structured task: 35% of their responses were coded as examples of Autonomy, 33% as Community, and 33% as Divinity. Filipinos also showed equal facility at providing examples for each assigned rhetoric. The percentage of rules from assigned categories that were coded as true examples of that category were 67% for Autonomy, 73% for Community, and 74% for Divinity. In contrast to Americans, the infusion of specific themes that appeared most often was the language of Community, with themes of duty, status, hierarchy, and interdependence. Community language appeared in 25% of responses overall compared with 18% for Autonomy and 12% for Divinity. At the item level of infusion coding, when asked to give examples of Autonomy, far more Filipino responses than American responses invoked language of Community: 6% of American examples of Autonomy contained Community key terms, whereas 15% of Filipino responses contained such language, $\chi^2 (1) = 10.94$, $p < .001$. In particular, the issue of interdependence showed up much more often in Filipino examples of Autonomy than in American examples (13% in the Philippines vs. 4% in America), $\chi^2 (1) = 11.82$, $p < .001$.

STUDY 2: MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS

Whereas Study 1 examined the content of rules related to Shweder's three moral rhetorics, in Study 2 we focused on moral transgressions. We reasoned that people may have an easier time describing violations of moral codes of conduct than articulating what exactly the codes are, and we believed that the longer responses expected in this task would provide more opportunity to observe the natural rhetorics used in each culture when discussing moral issues.

METHOD

Participants

Eighty-two introductory psychology students at the University of Wisconsin and 40 introductory psychology students at the University of the Philippines participated in this study in exchange for extra credit.

Materials

Participants were presented with a questionnaire in which the three "categories" (moral rhetorics) were described as in Study 1 and were asked to generate three examples of transgressions in each category. Thought-listing boxes were provided for each transgression. The order of the presentation of the categories was counterbalanced. Instructions for Filipino participants were presented in both Tagalog and English, as were the descriptions of the categories. The key portions of the instructions read:

> We are interested in the types of transgressions that occur in each category. A transgression occurs when one or more of the rules in a category is "broken". In other words, a transgression takes place when someone does something that others might consider wrong.
>
> After carefully reading the category descriptions on the pages that follow, we would like you to think of events where either you or someone you know violated a rule or rules relating to each category. You should describe three transgressions in enough detail that they could be easily understood by anyone reading them. These transgressions can be common or uncommon; there are no right or wrong responses.

Procedure

Participants were run in groups of 10-15 and were seated far enough apart to ensure confidentiality. The descriptions of the categories were read out loud to the participants, and participants were again informed that their responses would be completely anonymous. Participant data from the Philippines were translated, where necessary, by Filipino research assistants prior to coding.

Coding. Participants' responses were coded using the same coding protocol as in Study 1, with one minor additional category that was common in the responses of Study 2: "People should not engage in unnatural sexual practices." Two coders experienced with the system from Study 1 coded the responses from both countries. Interrater reliability was assessed by having both coders rate a subset of 10% of the total responses, including data from both countries. Agreement between coders was 93.2% and did not differ significantly according to the rhetoric coded. The codable data set, all participant examples less those not reporting transgressions (2.5% of American data, 0.6% of Filipino data) and those not classifiable by our system (2.8% of American data, 1.4% of Filipino data), consisted of 671 transgressions in the United States and 350 transgressions in the Philippines.

RESULTS

We hypothesized that in America as compared to the Philippines, Autonomy transgressions would be most frequently generated overall, most likely to be generated according to rhetoric instruction, and most likely to infuse American descriptions of moral transgressions

TABLE 2
Classification of Moral Transgressions: Study 2

	United States				Republic of the Philippines			
	Autonomy	*Community*	*Divinity*	p <	*Autonomy*	*Community*	*Divinity*	p <
Percentage of transgressions in each rhetoric	44	33	22	.001	35	37	29	.186
Percentage of category-appropriate transgressions	86	81	66	.001	71	81	80	.136
Percentage of transgressions infused with themes from each rhetoric	35	21	13	.001	34	18	13	.0001

related to all three rhetorics. Table 2 presents the results and statistical comparisons relevant to these three predictions. Consistent with our first prediction, Americans generated more Autonomy-related moral transgressions than transgressions related to the other two rhetorics. Moral transgressions coded as Autonomy examples comprised 44% of the American data set overall, compared with 33% for Community and 22% for Divinity. Consistent with our second prediction, American respondents were better able to produce Autonomy examples when asked than the other two rhetorics. When asked to give examples of Autonomy transgressions, Americans did so 86% of the time, compared with 81% for Community examples and only 66% for Divinity examples. Consistent with our third prediction, American respondents described moral transgressions that were infused with the language of Autonomy—harm, rights, freedom, and justice—in 35% of examples, more often than the language of the other two rhetorics (21% for Community, 13% for Divinity).

In contrast, Filipino respondents provided examples at approximately the rate determined by the nature of the task. As seen in Table 2, 35% of the overall data set was coded as Autonomy examples, 37% as Community examples, and 29% as Divinity examples. Filipinos showed equal ability to provide examples of each rhetoric, providing category-appropriate responses in 71% of Autonomy, 81% of Community, and 80% of Divinity assignments. In this study, the Filipino examples were infused by specific language from the ethics of Autonomy (34%) more often than from the other rhetorics (18% for Community, 13% for Divinity).

STUDY 3: OPEN-ENDED SCENARIOS

Studies 1 and 2 provided suggestive evidence that Americans emphasize the language of Autonomy in their descriptions of moral rules and transgressions, whereas Filipinos seem more able to discuss moral issues in all three moral rhetorics. However, both studies are limited by the fact that we asked participants to generate moral rules and transgressions to fit our descriptions of the rhetorics, which may have prompted them to give certain kinds of responses, thus biasing our assessment of moral concepts of the two cultures. In Study 3, therefore, we used an open-ended task to collect examples of moral transgressions to test our

TABLE 3
Classification of Open-Ended Scenarios: Study 3

	United States				Republic of the Philippines			
	Autonomy	Community	Divinity	p <	Autonomy	Community	Divinity	p <
Percentage scenarios in each rhetoric	60	24	16	.001	39	25	37	.315
Percentage of scenarios infused with themes from each rhetoric	25	4	0	.001	24	14	14	.222

central hypothesis that America is an Autonomy-focused culture whereas the Philippines emphasizes all three moral rhetorics.

METHOD

Participants

Fifty-five introductory psychology students at the University of Wisconsin and 41 introductory psychology students at the University of the Philippines participated in exchange for extra credit. Participants were interviewed individually in sessions lasting up to 30 minutes.

Procedure

Participants were interviewed by undergraduate research assistants and asked to provide three examples of "something that should not happen." The interviews were transcribed by the interviewer. Responses in Tagalog were translated by the Filipino research assistants; any terms that did not have direct English equivalents were described rather than translated.

Coding. The data set was composed of 266 scenarios for the United States and 205 scenarios for the Philippines. The data were subjected to the same coding protocol as in Study 2. Two expert coders, experienced with the system from Studies 1 and 2, coded the responses from both countries. Interrater reliability was assessed by having both coders rate a subset of 10% of the total responses, including data from both countries. Agreement between coders was 88.3% and did not differ significantly according to the rhetoric chosen.

Of the full set of participant responses, in the United States, 1.1% did not report moral violations (e.g., "You slip on the ice and fall down."), and 6.0% were not classifiable. In the Philippines, 0.5% did not report moral violations, and 2.4% were not classifiable, leaving 247 scenarios in the United States and 199 in the Philippines.

RESULTS

We predicted that Americans, when asked in an unprompted way to describe moral violations, would emphasize Autonomy violations; moreover, we predicted that specific Autonomy-related themes of rights, harm, justice, and freedom would infuse American open-ended descriptions of moral violations more than Community- and Divinity-related

Figure 1: Frequency of Mention of Three Moral Rhetorics in Guided and Unguided Tasks for the United States (US) and the Republic of the Philippines (RP)

themes. In contrast, we expected that Filipinos would show a "multilingual" approach to morality, providing examples from each of the three rhetorics.

Table 3 presents the classification of participant responses into each of the moral rhetorics. Americans overwhelmingly produced examples related to Autonomy (60% of all examples were coded as Autonomy themes, compared with 24% for Community and 16% for Divinity). Moreover, the specific themes that infused their answers came almost exclusively from Autonomy. One quarter of their total responses contained the key words of Autonomy, whereas only 4% of responses mentioned Community themes, and no responses mentioned Divinity themes. In contrast, in the Philippines, the examples came from all three rhetorics (39% Autonomy, 25% Community, 37% Divinity). And unlike the American examples, in the Philippines there was spontaneous mention of the themes of all three of the moral rhetorics (24% Autonomy, 14% Community, 14% Divinity).

Physical harm was the specific theme most often mentioned throughout the data set, mentioned by Americans in 18% of responses and by Filipinos in 19% of responses. There were, however, some differences between countries on the specific themes. As in Study 2, Filipinos mentioned interdependence in 8% of responses, whereas in no instance did an American participant mention the theme of interdependence in describing a moral violation, χ^2 (1) = 18.84, $p < .001$. In fact, no Americans mentioned the Community themes of hierarchy and interdependence or any of the Divinity themes (pure body, pure spirit, pure thought, pure behavior). These results lead to the significant effect for country on infusion of Community (4% United States, 14% Philippines), χ^2 (1) = 14.20, $p < .001$, and Divinity (0% United States, 14% Philippines), χ^2 (1) = 33.85, $p < .001$.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3

DIFFERENTIAL EMPHASIS ON MORAL RHETORICS

In all three studies, Americans tended strongly to describe morality in the rhetoric of Autonomy, centering on themes related to harm, rights, justice, and freedom. As seen in

Figure 2:   Percentage of Category-Appropriate Responses for Each Moral Rhetoric in Guided Tasks for the United States (US) and the Republic of the Philippines (RP)

Figure 1, this elaboration is present even in the face of explicit instructions to pay equal attention to all three rhetorics. Once these instructions are removed, American discussion of moral issues is even more dominated by Autonomy. In contrast, Filipinos showed a relatively balanced representation of the three moral rhetorics, whether the task was guided or unguided. In some measures, a particular rhetoric appears significantly more often than the others, but there is no consistent pattern across the three studies and the various measures that indicate any of the rhetorics holds a dominant position in Filipino moral thought.

This pattern of elaboration—American reliance on Autonomy and Filipino facility with all three rhetorics—is also seen in the way participants responded to the instructions in the guided studies. As seen in Figure 2, Americans easily responded with examples of Autonomy rules or violations; in each study, more than 86% of the respondents were able to generate category-appropriate responses. However, in the other two rhetorics, American participants were able to generate appropriate examples far less often. In contrast, the Filipino respondents actually gave the fewest category-appropriate responses in Autonomy, and they were able to give more examples for Community and Divinity.

CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN SPECIFIC CONTENT

Differences

In general, Americans and Filipinos tended to mention specific rules with fairly similar frequencies, although there were cultural differences for some rules (see the appendix). For instance, Filipinos were more likely to generate the rule that public leaders should not abuse authority, and the rule that people should follow religious beliefs; Americans in contrast, were more likely to mention the value that people should be treated equally and fairly.

The coding categories that showed the greatest differences between the two countries, across all three tasks, included cheating, sexual infidelity, religious beliefs, and leaders' abuse of authority. Examining the 18 themes that showed cross-cultural differences of at least 1%, all (6 of 6) of those in the rhetoric of Autonomy were mentioned more often in America than in the Philippines, and most of the responses in the Community and Divinity

rhetorics (3 of 5 and 8 of 9, respectively) were mentioned more frequently by Filipinos than Americans.

Similarities

Although it can be tempting to focus on cross-cultural differences and ignore similarities, the first three studies revealed important similarities in the two cultures' representation of morality, or at least in how we assessed morality. Across tasks, respondents from both cultures were more likely to generate Autonomy-related rules and transgressions than rules and transgressions related to the other two rhetorics. In Studies 2 and 3, physical harm was the predominant violation across both rhetorics and cultures. Indeed, acts of violence are so pervasive that stories of physical harm are among the most frequently mentioned violations of Community and Divinity violations as well as Autonomy. In particular, when asked to give examples of Community violations, many Filipinos responded with instances that were scored as Autonomy violations because of the severity of physical harm. Often, these stories revolved around corrupt police or politicians. For example, one Filipino wrote:

> There are many persons who use their place in society in order to climb the ladder of power or to escape punishment. These people are often politicians, socialites, wealthy businessmen, and anyone holding office or power considered of consequence to society. They get away with murder, theft, rape, ecological abuse because they are in an institution and fighting them would be like walking through a steel vault. Either you get killed or get raped. These people think they are above the law because, like politicians, they could manipulate the law.

Though this specific violation was rarely seen in American data in the current study, it is conceivable that the omission reflects the relative tranquility of the current political climate in the United States. It is possible that among American subcultures where conflict with and abuse by authority figures is commonly perceived, or during more turbulent political periods in the mainstream culture, such violations would become prominent in American descriptions of morality as well.

Finally, the specific moral violations that members of the two cultures most frequently mentioned across the three studies were quite similar: In America, physical harm, cheating or stealing, and shirking duties were most frequently mentioned violations; in the Philippines, the order of frequency was physical harm, shirking duties, and public leaders' abuse of authority. Consistent with Kohlberg's theorizing, the ethics of Autonomy are pervasive and central. However, even among American respondents, one of the most frequently mentioned immoral acts is the failure to perform duties to others. Although this act may be conceptualized as consistent with the "social contracts" aspect of a harm-based morality, we believe the most salient theme is the Community-based concern with preserving social networks.

CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3

Autonomy strongly dominated the moral world of these American respondents in terms of frequency of mention, the facility of generating relevant examples from the three moral rhetorics, and the infusion of specific themes. On the same measures, Filipino respondents demonstrated a relatively equal emphasis on the three rhetorics. In sum, Filipinos are "multilingual" with regard to moral language, as their culture and history would predict; Americans speak only a single language, though it is deeply ingrained and easily accessed.

The first three studies relied on participants' conceptions of moral rules and transgressions to map out the moral space of American and Filipino respondents. We have yet to address whether these cultural differences and similarities, and the utility of Shweder's model more generally, persist when examined according to criteria used in the morality literature. In the next study, we use the moral rules generated by our Study 1 participants to examine moral status according to issues such as universality, consensus, and importance.

STUDY 4: TESTING THE MORAL NATURE OF PARTICIPANT DATA

Moral standards differ theoretically from other behavioral regulations such as social convention or personal choice. Moral judgments, but not social conventions, are binding and obligatory for members of society; people perceive moral rules as arising from something beyond mere agreement or consensus (e.g., Lapsley, 1996; Miller et al., 1990; Turiel, 1977, 1983). The obligation to obey a moral standard is not dependent on the situational context in which one finds oneself, but is based on deeper principles. There is little choice for an individual about being subject to a moral standard, and such standards are perceived to be universal (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Haidt et al., 1993; Lapsley, 1996).

In Study 4, we presented moral rules obtained from participants in two countries in Study 1 to new samples of participants in the same two countries. These participants were asked to evaluate the moral rules along four dimensions that are thought to differentiate moral rules from other rules, namely, the importance, universality, contextual independence, and choice related to each rule. Again based on differences in the two cultures' conceptions of the self and the social order, we predicted that Americans would attribute higher moral status on these four dimensions to Autonomy-related rules, whereas Filipinos would consider the rules from all three rhetorics to be moral along these dimensions.

METHOD

Materials

The 46 rules that summarized American and Filipino responses in Study 1 were divided into three sets of 15 or 16 rules. The sets were used to create three versions of the questionnaire, to avoid subject fatigue. Each set contained examples, in random order, from all three moral rhetorics. Participants were asked to make ratings on a 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*) scale for how important the rule was, to what degree the rule should be universally followed, to what degree the rule should be followed by all people in all situations (a measure of contextual independence), and how much choice people have about whether to follow the rule.

Participants

Fifty undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of Wisconsin and 58 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of the Philippines participated in this task in sessions lasting less than 30 minutes. Students received extra credit for participation. Between 15 and 20 participants from each country completed one of the three versions of the questionnaire.

TABLE 4
Mean Qualitative Ratings of Moral Rules: Study 4

	United States			Republic of the Philippines		
	Autonomy	*Community*	*Divinity*	*Autonomy*	*Community*	*Divinity*
Importance	5.85_{aA}	5.31_{bA}	4.62_{cA}	6.04_{aA}	5.88_{aB}	5.28_{bB}
Universality	4.92_{aA}	4.73_{aA}	4.08_{bA}	5.71_{aB}	5.39_{bB}	5.01_{cB}
Context free	5.57_{aA}	5.04_{bA}	4.34_{cA}	5.90_{aB}	5.49_{bB}	5.19_{bB}
Choice	5.39_{aA}	5.57_{bA}	6.04_{cA}	5.26_{aA}	5.56_{bA}	5.82_{cA}

NOTE: Ratings were made on a 1 to 7 scale. Means with different lowercase subscripts within a country, across moral rhetoric, differ at $p < .05$ (planned comparison/least significant difference test). Means with different upper-case subscripts within a moral rhetoric, between countries, differ at $p < .05$.

Procedure

Participants, seated far enough apart to ensure confidentiality, were run in large groups of 15-20 in sessions lasting no more than 30 minutes. Participants were presented with the statements on the questionnaire and told they had been collected from many people in different places. They were advised that although they may or may not agree with any given statement, they should indicate their opinion about each statement by making the four ratings.

RESULTS

We hypothesized that Americans would attribute greater moral status to Autonomy-related rules, whereas Filipinos would consider rules from all three rhetorics to be moral. As predicted, Americans rated rules from Autonomy as more important, independent of context, and less determined by individual choice than rules related to Community and Divinity (means and statistical comparisons of means are presented in Table 4). We conducted analyses of variance with country as a between-subjects factor and rhetoric as a within-subjects factor for each of the ratings. In terms of country effects, Americans rated rules from the three rhetorics as less important, $F(1, 104) = 12.05$, $p < .001$, less universal, $F(1, 104) = 19.47$, $p < .001$, and less contextually independent, $F(1, 104) = 11.18$, $p < .001$, than did Filipinos.

This analysis also revealed that on all four ratings including choice, there was a significant main effect for rhetoric such that Autonomy was given the rating most consistent with moral status. Namely, compared with Community and Divinity rules, Autonomy rules in both cultures were considered more important, $F(2, 208) = 52.81$, $p < .001$, more universal, $F(2, 208) = 28.08$, $p < .001$, more contextually independent, $F(2, 208) = 35.18$, $p < .001$, and to allow less personal choice, $F(2, 208) = 14.57$, $p < .001$. The main effects for the importance ratings, however, were qualified by a significant country by rhetoric interaction, such that the difference in ratings among the rhetorics for Americans was greater than for Filipinos, $F(2, 208) = 3.59$, $p < .03$. Americans also rated Autonomy-related rules more universally applicable than Divinity, although on this measure they attributed equal moral status to Community-related rules. Filipinos, in contrast, rated rules related to Autonomy and Community as similar in importance and choice, although they did indicate that Autonomy-related rules were more universal and contextually independent than rules related to Community and Divinity.

DISSCUSSION

Consistent with our hypothesis that Autonomy dominates the moral system of Americans, Americans tended to view Autonomy rules in the way most consistent with moral status, consistent with the cognitive-developmental tradition of morality (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971), which has long emphasized the importance of harm, individual rights, justice, and freedom. Americans indicated that Autonomy rules were more important, more universal, less dependent on context, and less owing to personal choice than rules from the rhetorics of Community and Divinity. In contrast, the Filipino respondents generally found all the rules to be higher in aspects of moral status, and there were fewer distinctions among the three moral rhetorics. Both of these results are consistent with the idea that Filipinos "speak" the multiple languages of morality with greater ease and diversity than do Americans.

STUDY 5: ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN
THREE MORAL RHETORICS AND EMOTION

Although historically it has been widely assumed that emotion and moral judgment stand in opposition to one another (Lapsley, 1996), more recent theorists have argued that emotion is central to moral categories and judgments (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Rozin, 1996; Weiner, 1995). Certain theorists have recently proposed that Shweder's three moral rhetorics are associated with different emotions. Specifically, it has been proposed that Autonomy relates to anger, Community relates to contempt, and Divinity relates to disgust (Haidt et al., 1993). The evidence for these claims is indirect at best. A review of the emotion appraisal literature does suggest that violations of rights and harm relate to anger, violations of hierarchy relate to contempt, and violations of purity relate to disgust (summarized in Lazarus, 1991). Although relevant, these studies were not carried out to directly address moral-emotion associations.

The purposes of Study 5, therefore, were twofold. First, it was of interest to document cultural similarities and differences in the relations between Autonomy, Community, and Divinity and anger, contempt, and disgust. Second, it was of interest to test for systematic cultural differences in associations between moral rhetorics and emotion. The general hypothesis motivating our studies is that America is an Autonomy-focused culture, whereas the Philippines emphasizes all three moral rhetorics. To the extent that a culture emphasizes one moral rhetoric over others, it should amplify likely associations between that rhetoric and emotion. This reasoning led us to posit that Americans would associate anger with Autonomy in a more pronounced fashion than Filipinos would.

METHOD

Participants

Sixty undergraduates from the University of Wisconsin and 60 undergraduates from the University of the Philippines participated in this study. Participants were introductory psychology students who received extra credit after participating in sessions lasting approximately 30 minutes.

TABLE 5
Association Between Moral Rule Rhetorics and
Facial Expressions of Emotion (in percentages)

	United States			Republic of the Philippines		
	Autonomy	Community	Divinity	Autonomy	Community	Divinity
Anger	37	22	8	30	26	13
Contempt	16	37	32	13	28	29
Disgust	17	20	22	18	27	26
Happiness	3	2	13	6	2	5
Sadness	10	9	11	16	10	10
Shame	12	9	9	12	6	5
Fear	5	1	6	5	1	11

NOTE: Numbers are percentage of participants who selected the indicated facial expression of emotion as the best correspondent to examples of moral violations in each rhetoric (i.e., in the United States, 37% of respondents selected anger as the best match to violations of Autonomy rules).

Materials

The 46 rules obtained in Study 1 were presented as violations on three versions of a questionnaire. For examples, for the rule "People should not harm others physically," the corresponding violation is "A person harms someone else physically." As in Study 4, the violations were broken into three separate lists, with 15-16 violations in each version of the list. Each list contained statements in equal proportion from all three moral rhetorics, presented in random order.

Procedure

A questionnaire was created presenting seven photographs assumed to represent the following emotions: the target emotions of anger, contempt, disgust, as well as happiness, shame, fear, and sadness. A previous judgment study with American participants found that observers reliably identified each photo as expressing the target emotion with above-chance accuracy (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). The sole exception was contempt, which was often labeled as disgust, consistent with studies indicating that the identification of contempt displays hinges on context (Russell, 1994). Thus, the findings from the study do not support a stringent test of the Community-contempt relationship in the current investigation; we address this issue in the discussion. Half of the questionnaires had pictures of a woman posing the facial expressions, and the other half had pictures of a man posing the facial expressions. The sex of the person in the photograph had no effect on results and therefore will not be discussed further. One of the three lists of moral violations was presented beneath the pictures. The instructions read:

> The people in these pictures are reacting to something they just saw in another person. Read the sixteen statements below. Decide which of the people pictured just saw the person described in the statement. Write the number of that picture in the blank provided. You may use a picture more than once, and you do not have to use all of the pictures.

RESULTS

Our first prediction stated that across the two cultures Autonomy violations would be labeled with anger faces, Community violations with contempt faces, and Divinity violations with disgust faces. Table 5 presents the frequencies with which participants in both countries labeled the violations of the three ethics with the seven different facial expressions.

The overall chi-square analysis found that across the two countries the rule violations within the three rhetorics were labeled with different facial expressions, $\chi^2 (12) = 280.97, p < .001$. The three rhetorics produced different overall patterns of emotion expression attributions in the United States, $\chi^2 (12) = 183.78, p < .001$, and in the Philippines, $\chi^2 (12) = 137.22$, $p < .001$. Consistent with the expected associations between Shweder's rhetorics and specific emotions, across the two cultures anger was more likely to be referred to in labeling Autonomy violations than contempt or disgust expressions, $\chi^2 (2) = 75.03, p < .001$, and contempt expressions were more commonly chosen to label Community violations than the disgust and anger expressions, $\chi^2 (2) = 18.36, p < .001$. The results for disgust and Divinity were not as strong: In labeling Divinity violations, across the two cultures contempt was the most common response, but disgust was more commonly referred to than the average of the anger and contempt frequencies, $\chi^2 (2) = 82.33, p < .001$.

The emotion-focused analyses revealed similar findings. Given an Autonomy violation, Anger was most commonly chosen as a label, both in the United States, $\chi^2 (2) = 71.69, p < .001$, and in the Philippines, $\chi^2 (2) = 28.90, p < .001$. Given a Community violation, contempt was most commonly chosen as a label in both the United States, $\chi^2 (2) = 52.87, p < .001$, and the Philippines, $\chi^2 (2) = 38.58, p < .001$.

Comparisons of the two cultures revealed that Americans and Filipinos did differ in the responses they gave for each rhetoric, in the case of Autonomy, $\chi^2 (6) = 12.68, p < .05$, Community, $\chi^2 (6) = 16.62, p < .01$, and Divinity, $\chi^2 (6) = 33.12, p < .001$. Our culture-specific prediction held that the association between anger and Autonomy would be greater in the United States than the Philippines. Consistent with this prediction, Americans were more likely to label Autonomy violations with anger than Filipinos (37% vs. 30%), $\chi^2 (1) = 4.86, p < .05$, and less likely to use the anger expression to label violations of rules from the other two rhetorics (in the United States, 15% vs. 19.5% in the Philippines), $\chi^2 (1) = 8.64, p < .003$.

The results from Study 5 for the most part supported our two hypotheses. First, participants' labeling of different moral violations with facial expressions of emotion revealed, with one exception, the expected associations between moral rhetoric and emotion: Anger was associated with Autonomy and contempt with Community. Contrary to our hypothesis, Divinity violations were more commonly associated with facial displays of contempt. This may be attributable to the ambiguity of the "contempt" display, which in past research was actually a strong signal of disgust (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). More generally, we suspect that these associations between emotion and morality would be stronger had we used only prototypical moral violations rather than sampling more comprehensively from the three rhetorics as we did. In general, however, these findings indicate that the different moral rhetorics to a certain extent are organized around different emotions. Given that emotions such as anger and disgust influence cognition in different ways (e.g., Keltner et al., 1993; Rozin, 1996), one might expect the three rhetorics to be associated with different kinds of cognition as well. This question is an important direction for future research.

Second, we had reasoned that specific emotion-morality associations would be stronger in cultures that emphasize one moral rhetoric over another. This led us to expect Americans to more strongly associate anger with violations of autonomy than Filipinos, which indeed

was confirmed. Again, this finding has interesting implications for related social phenomena, such as the emotional tone of moral conflicts and preferences for punishment of moral violations. Our research indicates that Americans construe morality in terms of Autonomy, and violations of these rules elicit anger. These findings, in combination with theorizing about the role of anger in punishment (Weiner, 1995), lead to clear predictions about why Americans may be inclined to prefer certain forms of punishment, such as retributive punishment, following moral violations.

Before turning to the general discussion, we cannot help but discuss one striking cross-cultural difference in the emotions associated with moral violations. Specifically, violations of Divinity, which often referred to sexual and drug-related behavior, were quite frequently associated with the happy facial expression in the United States and the fear expression in the Republic of the Philippines. This finding may reflect the more libertine attitudes of American college students compared with their Filipino counterparts, or the stricter policies regarding these actions in Filipino universities. The finding also points to the interesting juxtaposition in which one individual's moral violation is another's source of pleasure.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

CULTURAL DIFFERENCE AND SIMILARITIES

To the extent that morality is concerned with universal principles of behavior (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Turiel, 1983), the study of morality is meaningfully informed by cross-cultural comparisons concerning the content of moral judgments. Cross-cultural studies of morality have recently centered on cultural similarities and differences in what is considered moral (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993; Miller et al., 1990), in addition to well-established questions about cognitive development in moral reasoning (Snarey, 1985) and distinctions drawn between morals and conventions (Turiel, 1983). The present investigation, informed by Shweder's three-rhetoric approach to morality, documented coherent cultural differences and similarities in American and Filipino conceptions of morality.

As hypothesized, Autonomy, the rhetoric of harm, rights, and justice, was clearly the most salient moral rhetoric to American participants. Autonomy was the most frequent category used to classify American examples of moral rules and transgressions; the language of Autonomy infused American descriptions of Community and Divinity violations; Autonomy rules were viewed by Americans as the most important, universal, and obligatory; and Autonomy violations were most strongly associated with anger for Americans. With some exceptions, the American respondents seemed to act as the Kohlbergian position might have predicted; they confirmed that, for them, "true" morality is largely concerned with issues of Autonomy.

In contrast, the Filipino view of morality was much broader than that of Americans, as would be expected from the diverse historical and cultural forces that have defined the Filipino conception of the social order. Filipinos accorded moral status to the familiar rhetoric of rights, freedom, and harm, consistent with previous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Snarey, 1985), but at the same time indicated that other moral principles were moral as well, including rules and transgressions related to family networks, harmony, smooth interpersonal relationships, and religious beliefs. All three of the moral rhetorics occurred in discussions of moral issues in Studies 1, 2, and 3; all three of the rhetorics were rated high in Study 4 on criteria of morality. The findings from this investigation, combined with the systematic

examination of Community- and Divinity-based moral problems (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993; Miller et al., 1990) according to rigorous theoretical criteria, suggest that there is more to morality around the world than the concepts of rights, harm, and justice that have been studied in the past.

Our focus on more global categories of moral rules and transgressions is certain to have masked even further cultural differences in the content of those moral concepts. For example, although both American and Filipino respondents accorded Autonomy-related rules and transgressions with elevated moral status, the specific content of those rules and transgressions often differed. American students in general tended to mention rules such as "You have a right to be yourself," "You should express yourself," and "You should treat people equally and fairly." Filipinos, in contrast, more often mentioned rules such as "You should restrain yourself to avoid harming others" and "You should not coerce others in any way." Students from the two cultures agreed that rights, harm, and justice were important; they differed in more specific construals of what those concepts mean. Likewise, whereas American conceptions of Divinity often revolved around health and dietary practices, Filipino college students emphasized religious practices and mentioned rules about sexual behavior—prohibitions of premarital and extramarital sex, promiscuity, public displays of affection, homosexuality—at a much higher rate than did Americans.

VALIDITY OF SHWEDER'S THREE MORAL RHETORICS

To expand the traditional rights-based view of morality and account for documented cultural variation in moral concepts, Shweder has proposed that moral thought across cultures is characterized by three rhetorics: Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. One aim of this investigation was to provide validation evidence relevant to this new characterization of morality, and to do so by examining the contents of these three rhetorics as generated by participants, rather than relying on a priori theories about what the content *ought* to be.

On one hand, many of our central findings suggest that Kohlberg was fundamentally right, that justice-based rules and violations are central to moral concepts across two dramatically different cultures. Across the different methods of the first three studies, the prototypical justice violation of physical harm was the most commonly mentioned rule and transgression in our assessments of participants' moral concepts. In Study 4, Autonomy-related rules were evaluated by members of both cultures as the most moral in terms of their importance, universality, and lack of contextual relativity. Finally, in Study 5, Autonomy-related violations, more than violations of the other two rhetorics, were most strongly associated with anger, which many consider to be the quintessentially moral emotion (e.g., Solomon, 1990).

Other findings, however, attest to the utility of Shweder's three-rhetoric framework and, more generally, the need to broaden conceptions of morality. The three rhetorics captured the rich network of rules and transgressions that participants invoked to define morality in the first three studies in a complete way, and they allowed us to generate specific predictions concerning cultural variation in morality and connections between morality and specific emotions.

Our results suggest that Shweder's taxonomy allows for important expansion of the conceptualization of morality in another culture and within that of the United States. For instance, Filipinos, unlike Americans, tended to ascribe moral status to rules and transgressions related to all three moral rhetorics. Had we relied on a priori definitions of morality and only studied Filipino reactions to Autonomy violations, we would have missed central

concepts that relate significantly to the Filipino moral code. We should also note that although American participants emphasized Autonomy in their moral concepts, Community and Divinity were often cited as examples of moral rules and transgressions. For example, 40% of their free-response descriptions of moral transgressions from Study 3 were classified in these two categories, suggesting that even in a rights- and harm-based culture such as America's, shirking duties and being impure are not negligible concerns.

LIMITATIONS

The present investigation suffered from several limitations. A first limitation pertains to the nature of our samples: In both countries, we surveyed the moral representations of young, relatively affluent participants in university settings. The University of the Philippines at Diliman, from which our Filipino respondents were drawn, is the flagship institution of the most prestigious university system in the country. As socioeconomic status (SES) has been shown to influence perceptions of morality, such that higher SES is associated with a more limited harm-based moral code (Haidt et al., 1993), the reliance on this kind of sample may have minimized differences between the moral representations of Americans and Filipinos. In that light, the repeated pattern of differential emphasis on the rhetorics in the two cultures is all the more striking.

Our reliance on college-aged, higher-SES students must also be borne in mind in reference to the Divinity-related findings from the current study. Specifically, the American college students, and to a lesser extent the Filipino college students, indicated that Divinity-related rules and transgressions were "less moral" than those of Autonomy and Community. As evident in previous research (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993), lower-SES individuals tend to evaluate violations of Divinity-related rules in moral terms whereas higher-SES individuals do not.

Research in the Philippines and the United States as a basis for cultural comparison has some advantages, as outlined earlier; in other ways it presents limitations. It is misleading to suggest that we have made a thorough cross-cultural investigation of these three rhetorics. Instead, using the particular social and cultural settings of these two countries, we have demonstrated that people may elaborate the rhetorics differently depending on the systems of values in their cultures. We are often asked to "separate" the influences of politics, religion, and the like from these findings, as though culture exists independent of such institutions. We do not believe that it does. For instance, the political and economic systems in the Philippines that make family networks and interpersonal relationships more important than efficiency (Watkins & Gerong, 1997) are represented in the overall incidence of Community themes in these data. If the political system were different, if it were less rife with the kinds of abuses noted by our participants, the proportions of the themes might change—but in either case, they reflect a part of the culture as experienced by the participants. It is similarly difficult to imagine assessing the culture of Americans separate from the political ideals of "liberty and justice for all," themes that dominate much of American moral discourse.

Finally, there were certain important limitations in our methods. We relied on verbal reports of moral rules and violations, which may be prone to a host of self-report biases and not capture certain moral concepts that guide thought and action. More specifically, we relied on thought-listing tasks to assess categories of morality. It is important to test our culture-specific predictions concerning differences in moral categories with other measures of categorization, such as those of category structure or accessibility.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The strength of Shweder's three-rhetoric model of morality lies in its ability to account for cultural differences and similarities in moral concepts and to generate specific predictions concerning the relations between morality and related domains, such as emotion. We see this investigation and similarly motivated ones as just the beginning of a wave of research that broadens conceptions of morality and connections between morality and other domains.

Certainly, one important line of inquiry pertains to studies of Shweder's three-rhetoric approach in other cultures. For example, one surprising finding from the present investigation was the limited role that Divinity played in participants' moral conceptions, in particular in the Philippines. Although Filipinos talked more about Divinity than did Americans, and considered it "more moral" than did Americans, in neither culture was Divinity accorded the same moral status as Autonomy and Community. It may be that Filipinos do not subscribe to the holistic view of the self that Shweder describes as the norm in India (Shweder & Bourne, 1982), which produces elevated concerns about Divinity and purity. Research in India or other cultures or subpopulations with such a view of the self might yield results in which Divinity is accorded the same moral status as the other two rhetorics.

Documentation of the kind of cultural differences that we observed in the present investigation raises the question of the origins and consequences of these cultural differences. That is, what social practices, values, customs, and institutions lead members of different cultures to espouse different moral principles? One interesting line of inquiry follows from our emotion-related findings. Specifically, the cultural valuation or emphasis of certain emotions over others that begins early in development and imbues myriad social practices, well identified in ethnographies of emotion in different cultures (e.g., Lutz & White, 1986), may embed its members in specific moral worldviews.

Finally, we believe that it is important to apply Shweder's three-rhetoric perspective to studies of other social phenomena. For example, certain subcultures or groups may define themselves according to Autonomy-, Community-, or Divinity-related concepts. The same may actually be true for certain individuals. The group- or individual-based differences in moral concepts, our results would suggest, would have important implications for definitions of right and wrong and the emotional nature of moral issues. These possibilities warrant exploration. In ongoing work, we are examining how stereotypes of minority groups contain themes of these rhetorics (e.g., a group perceived as violent, criminal, and welfare dependent violates the ethics of Autonomy, whereas a group perceived as perverted, diseased, and condemned by God violates the ethics of Divinity) and that the prejudice directed toward members of these groups is colored by particular types of emotional response (e.g., anger vs. disgust).

CONCLUSION

Conceptions of morality have largely emphasized the principles of individual rights, harm, and justice. The present investigation reveals that this moral code does well in describing the views of Americans, but that Filipinos, consistent with their cultural heritage, also conceptualize morality in terms of interdependence and purity. This pattern of findings is consistent with Shweder's recent theorizing, and it attests to the benefits of studying social phenomena through the lens of other cultures.

APPENDIX
Summary of Frequency of Coding Classes Across Two Cultures

	Percentage of Participant Responses Coded Into Each Class					
	Study 1		*Study 2*		*Study 3*	
Coding Classes	*US*	*RP*	*US*	*RP*	*US*	*RP*
Autonomy (justice)						
1. People should not harm others physically.	1.8	0.4	15.3	14.5	14.2	14.1
2. People should not harm others emotionally or mentally.	1.5	0.4	1.0	1.1	1.6	1.0
3. People should have the right to be themselves, to be free, and to act and think as they like.	11.5	6.1	2.2	2.9	0.0	3.0
4. People must express themselves, be independent, be nonconformist.	3.3	3.6	0.4	0.6	0.4	2.0
5. People should act with restraint and avoid harming others.	3.3	6.7	0.7	0.6	2.8	1.0
6. People should be open-minded and respect others' rights and beliefs.	6.8	6.5	1.0	0.3	0.8	1.5
7. People should not have the right to look down on others or judge others inappropriately.	9.1	4.4	2.4	2.6	4.0	4.5
8. People should be treated equally and fairly, given equal opportunity.	5.8	1.9	6.0	3.7	2.0	2.0
9. People should not expect special rights, status, or treatment.	1.1	0.2	2.1	0.3	0.4	0.5
10. People should treat others as they expect to be treated.	0.8	1.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.5
11. People should be punished appropriately for committing crimes.	0.4	0.8	8.7	4.3	0.4	0.5
12. People should not coerce others in any way.	1.6	3.4	1.0	1.1	3.6	2.5
13. People should not cheat, steal, commit crimes.	1.5	1.7	5.5	4.3	32.0	8.0
14. People have the right to self-defense.	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0
Community						
15. People should be pleasant, polite, courteous, and cooperative.	3.7	2.3	0.3	0.9	2.4	2.0
16. People should respect authority, leaders, or social hierarchy.	1.4	2.1	3.6	2.3	0.8	0.0
17. People should respect elders.	1.2	0.4	2.7	1.4	1.2	1.0
18. High status people should help low status people.	1.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0
19. High status people should set good examples.	3.1	0.4	1.0	2.9	0.4	1.5
20. High status people should not act superior or coercive toward low status people.	2.2	0.6	1.6	3.7	1.6	2.0
21. Public leaders should be good servants of the community, and not abuse authority.	1.6	1.1	4.1	10.9	0.8	2.5
22. People should be loyal and respectful members of a group/ community/society.	3.1	9.3	2.9	1.4	2.8	3.5
23. People should perform appropriate and expected duties, responsibilities to others.	3.3	3.4	11.6	9.4	6.1	2.5
24. People should be charitable.	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.5
25. People should work hard to achieve.	1.6	1.9	0.4	0.6	1.6	1.5
26. People should work to benefit the community.	2.7	2.3	1.5	0.6	0.0	0.0
27. People should be respectful and agreeable with peers (e.g., neighbors).	2.6	3.2	0.6	1.4	3.6	4.0
28. People should be associated with moral groups or families.	0.3	2.7	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.5
29. People should be humble, not stand out.	1.2	1.5	0.3	0.0	0.4	1.0
30. People should know their place/role in a group.	0.8	0.4	2.4	0.3	0.4	0.0
31. People should not be selfish.	0.4	1.1	0.1	0.3	1.2	1.0

(continued)

APPENDIX Continued

Coding Classes	Percentage of Participant Responses Coded Into Each Class					
	Study 1		Study 2		Study 3	
	US	RP	US	RP	US	RP
Divinity						
32. People should keep their bodies clean and healthy.	3.1	2.7	1.9	1.1	0.0	2.0
33. People should keep their mind/spirit/thoughts/feelings clean and pure	.2.3	4.4	1.5	3.1	0.0	0.0
34. People should not ingest noxious elements (drugs, cigarettes, alcohol).	2.8	1.7	8.6	3.7	2.0	4.0
35. People should be sexually faithful/monogamous.	0.7	0.6	1.3	2.3	1.6	6.0
36. People should not signal inappropriate sexual interest (e.g., flirt).	0.5	0.8	0.0	2.3	1.2	0.5
37. People should not be sexually promiscuous.	1.8	0.8	1.5	0.9	2.0	1.5
38. People should not engage in premarital sex.	0.7	2.3	1.5	2.6	0.4	3.0
39. People should follow religious beliefs.	1.6	5.9	0.9	3.4	0.0	2.0
40. People should follow personal ideals (emphasis on own values).	1.1	3.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0
41. People should be in control of themselves.	2.8	4.0	0.9	0.3	4.5	0.5
42. People should be pure in what they say (don't swear/lie/gossip).	2.9	3.5	0.7	0.9	1.6	7.0
43. People should keep personal belongings and environment clean.	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.5
44. People should protect the natural environment.	0.3	0.4	1.0	1.7	0.4	1.5
45. People should be moral individuals.	2.2	1.7	0.7	1.7	1.6	3.0
46. People should not display affection too publicly.	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
47. People should not engage in unnatural sexual practices.[a]			1.7	4.6	0.0	1.0

NOTE: US = United States, RP = Republic of the Philippines.
a. This category was used only for Studies 2 and 3.

NOTE

1. Examples of responses, in their entirety, that were not classified as rules were "eye contact"; "The person's personality"; "Experience"; "Whatever floats your boat."

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