

sions of other emotions, Darwin attributed no adaptive functions to the blush, nor did he identify the expressive predecessor of the blush in other species, claiming that the blush is “the most peculiar and the most human of all expressions” [Darwin, 1872, p 309]. Rather, he considered the blush and related states, including shame about moral violations, shame about breaches of etiquette (or what we will call embarrassment), modesty, and shyness, to be the byproducts of the uniquely human capacity of taking others’ perspective upon the self, and in particular upon one’s public appearance. Subsequent researchers have considered embarrassment, shame, modesty, and shyness to be secondary, more complex emotions that emerge later in life and depend upon uniquely human capacities, such as self-representation or causal attributions [Campos et al., 1983; Lewis, 1993; for exception, see Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1971]. Many theoretical accounts of these states have ignored the functions these emotions might serve [for summary, see Keltner and Buswell, in press].

Darwin’s mistake, we believe, was to ignore the evolutionary basis and functions of other behaviors that occur during the blush and related states, which include gaze aversion, face touching, head movements down, and smiling [Edelmann and Hampson, 1979; Keltner, 1995]. Had he done so, he would have been led, we believe, to the proposition that we advance in this article: that shame, embarrassment, modesty, and shyness have evolved from the appeasement systems of other species and serve appeasement-related functions. In making this argument, we first discuss the eliciting conditions, behavior, and social reconciliation associated with appeasement. Our review of the empirical evidence focuses on a) reactive appeasement, which reduces actual conflict and takes the form of two distinct emotions, embarrassment and shame, and b) anticipatory forms of appeasement, which are dispositional, interactive strategies that prevent potential conflicts from arising, and include modesty, politeness, and shyness. In the final section of the article, we consider social processes that encourage and prevent appeasement, such as teasing and punitive practices, and their effects upon social relations.

THE PROCESS OF HUMAN APPEASEMENT

Appeasement is the process by which individuals placate or pacify others in situations of potential or actual conflict. Diverse behaviors serve appeasement functions, including emotional displays, greeting rituals, offers of food, and formal apologies [de Waal, 1988; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Gilbert and Trower, 1990]. The most comprehensive accounts of appeasement are found in the ground-breaking studies of nonhuman primates’ appeasement and reconciliation processes [de Waal, 1986, 1988; de Waal and Luttrell, 1985; de Waal and Ren, 1988], and in the sociological and psychological analyses of human apologies and accounts [Goffman, 1956, 1967; Tavuchis, 1991]. Appeasement, as described by these researchers, unfold as follows: One individual, for various reasons, a) anticipates aggression from others, b) displays apologetic, submissive, and affiliative behavior, which c) prevents or reduces others’ aggression, increases social approach, and reestablishes the individual’s relation to others. Figure 1 represents this process of appeasement.

The conditions that elicit appeasement involve disrupted or potentially disrupted social relations. Violations of social rules are one class of situations that jeopardize social relations and elicit appeasement interactions. Appeasement also occurs in situations in which no explicit rule has been violated, but there is the heightened sense of potential




Fig. 1. Process of appeasement.

conflict and aggression, as in the case of interactions among strangers. If motivated to repair the social relation and avoid aggression, which in humans includes physical violence, harsh judgment, ostracism, neglect, or damage to personal reputation, the individual engages in appeasement behavior.

Human appeasement involves submissive, affiliative, and inhibited nonverbal, verbal, and experiential processes. Humans appease others with submissive nonverbal displays such as constricted posture, head movements down, and gaze aversion [Ellyson and Dovidio, 1985; Keltner, 1995], which are similar to the appeasement gestures of other species [de Waal, 1988; van Hooff, 1972], as well as with verbal apologies [Cupach and Metts, 1990]. Human appeasement also involves affiliative behavior, such as smiles and physical contact. Finally, human appeasement involves heightened self-evaluation and behavioral inhibition, which motivate the individual to adhere to social rules [Miller and Leary, 1992], to act deferentially [Gottman, 1967], and to avoid encroaching upon the rights of others [Chance, 1988].

Appeasement behavior brings about reconciliation, the process by which the appeasing individual and relevant others establish or reestablish a cooperative social relation, because of the effects nonverbal and verbal displays of appeasement have upon others. Human appeasement behavior signals to others the individual's knowledge, recognized importance, and commitment to the social relation, serving as a promise to engage in appropriate behavior worthy of others' trust and respect [Castelfranchi and Poggi, 1990; Goffman, 1967].

Appeasement behavior also evokes emotions in others that increase cooperation and reduce aggressive or punitive tendencies, much as appeasement gestures in other species produce affiliative behavior in others, such as grooming or sexual play [de Waal, 1988]. For example, embarrassment is known to produce laughter in others, which leads those individuals to make light of the mistake or mishap, thereby reducing the social distance produced by the mishap [Cupach and Metts, 1990]. Other forms of human appeasement evoke sympathy in others, which motivates others to forgive and offer comfort [Eisenberg et al., 1989], which again would reestablish the endangered social bond.

TWO CLASSES OF HUMAN APPEASEMENT

Only recently have social scientists begun to systematically consider the relation between submissiveness and appeasement and human emotion, social interaction, and personality [for relevant exceptions, see Clark, 1990; Ohman, 1986]. Recent theorists have attributed appeasement functions to the human smile [Keating, 1985; van Hooff,

1972], the blush [Castelfranchi and Poggi, 1990] and embarrassment [Keltner, 1995], and deference and submissiveness to shame [Gilbert and Trower, 1990; Scheff, 1988]. In the following sections we develop the relations between appeasement and human emotion, social practice, and personality. We focus on the states that Darwin originally clustered in his analysis of the blush—shame, embarrassment, polite modesty, and shyness. These concepts cluster in similar ways across cultures [Abu-Lughod, 1986], and serve, we will argue, appeasement functions.

We propose that there are two general classes of human appeasement that produce social reconciliation in different contexts. Reactive forms of appeasement reduce extant conflict, and are similar to corrective forms of “facework” that the sociologist Goffman [1967] so astutely described. Reactive forms of appeasement follow actual, discrete events, such as transgressions of morals or conventions, that disrupt social relations and require immediate response. Reactive forms of appeasement, therefore, are likely to be discrete and state-like in nature and engage humans in brief emotional exchanges. Embarrassment and shame are two forms of reactive appeasement that redress different kinds of transgressions.

Anticipatory appeasement involves more general strategies that prevent potential conflict from occurring. Anticipatory forms of appeasement help individuals avoid conflict when it is likely, e.g., during the distribution of resources such as food, physical space, or social attention, and during interactions with strangers. Anticipatory forms of appeasement are, therefore, likely to be trait-like dispositions or strategies individuals demonstrate or rely upon consistently across general classes of situations to avoid conflict. Polite modesty and shyness are two forms of anticipatory appeasement in humans.

REACTIVE FORMS OF APPEASEMENT: EMBARRASSMENT AND SHAME

Are embarrassment and shame distinct emotions? Historically, emotion researchers have classified embarrassment and shame as the same emotion [Izard, 1971; Tomkins, 1963]. Recent research, however, has documented that embarrassment and shame have distinct nonverbal displays that are reliably identified by observers across cultures [Haidt and Keltner, 1996; Keltner, 1995; Keltner and Buswell, in press]. The embarrassment display unfolds in the following pattern of nonverbal behavior: gaze aversion, a smile control, smile, a second smile control, and then head movements down and face touching. Shame is communicated by gaze and head movements down. Human embarrassment and shame displays, furthermore, resemble the appeasement displays of other species, which also often involve gaze aversion, facial actions similar to smiling, head movements down, reduced physical size, and even self-touching or grooming [Keltner and Buswell, in press].

Although both are forms of reactive appeasement, embarrassment and shame follow different transgressions: Embarrassment follows transgressions of social conventions, which are culturally specific rules that govern social intercourse, such as manners of addressing others, eating, and dressing, whereas shame follows more serious violations that reflect the individual’s character [Keltner and Buswell, in press]. Given that embarrassment and shame relate to different spheres of rule-governed behavior, we propose that they appease others through different processes. We have already described how their displays are subtly different. We will now present evidence that shows that embarrassment and shame displays are indeed associated with different eliciting condi-

tions and that they evoke different inferential and emotional responses in others that promote reconciliation. Some evidence comes from previously published studies, and other evidence comes from new studies that for the first time examine the distinct appeasement processes associated with embarrassment and shame displays. In these new studies, participants were presented with slides depicting five displays posed by one male and one female poser: anger, a likely response during social conflict, a neutral expression, shame, embarrassment, and amusement (laughter). The photographs of the female poser are presented in Figure 2. Participants viewed each slide for 5 sec and then rated it on appeasement-related dimensions. The four new studies addressed whether embarrassment and shame displays are associated with different transgressions (Study 1), lead to inferences of trustworthiness (Study 2), and evoke different emotions that facilitate social reconciliation (Studies 3 and 4).

Rule Violations: The Antecedents of Embarrassment and Shame

When asked to describe the causes of embarrassment and shame, individuals describe different events: embarrassment follows violations of social conventions that govern people’s interactions in public settings, whereas shame follows violations of a more serious, moral nature [Edelmann, 1987; Keltner and Buswell, 1996; Miller, 1992; Miller and Tangney, 1994; Tangney, 1992]. Study 1 addressed whether participants make different inferences about the causes of embarrassment and shame from brief observations of the displays of these emotions. Participants were asked to choose from 10 events the event that would produce the emotion shown in the photo. Figure 3 presents the results from Study 1.

As evident in Figure 3, people more frequently associated displays of embarrassment with transgressions of conventions that govern public demeanor (i.e., tripping in public) than shame displays, which led participants to infer that the individual in the photo had transgressed a more serious rule (i.e., hurting someone’s feelings or failing an exam). Clearly social observers associate the displays of embarrassment and shame with different transgressions, as we proposed. We next address whether displays of embarrassment and shame evoke different inferences and emotions in others that promote reconciliation.

Informative and Evocative Functions of Embarrassment and Shame Displays

In humans, appeasement behavior leads to social reconciliation by signaling the individual’s commitment to the social norms and by evoking emotions that increase cooperation and reduce aggression. Two lines of evidence attest to these hypothesized




Fig. 2. Photos of displays presented to observers.




Fig. 3. Inferences made from displays about emotion antecedents.

properties of embarrassment and shame displays. First, consistent with Victorian era speculations that the blush is the external sign of moral character [Burgess, 1839], individuals who are prone to follow social norms are more likely to display [Keltner and Buswell, in press] and report intense embarrassment [Miller, 1995], whereas individuals who are prone to antisocial behavior show little embarrassment relative to other groups [Keltner et al., 1995]. Embarrassment, these studies show, is an external marker of the individual's general tendency to adhere to social norms.

Study 2 more directly examined whether embarrassment and shame displays communicate the recognition and commitment to social norms and morals. Prior to viewing each photo of the five expressions, observers were asked to imagine that the individual in each photo had tripped in public. Participants then rated the individual in terms of four prosocial qualities (trustworthy, likeable, content, and well-adjusted) and two antisocial qualities (destructive and dangerous) on 7-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*). Figure 4 presents the levels of prosocial character (the mean of the four relevant items) and antisocial character (the mean of the two relevant items) that observers attributed to the individuals posing the five different emotional displays.

One sample *t* tests found that observers attributed more prosocial than antisocial character




Fig. 4. Inferences made from displays about character of individual.

to individuals who displayed embarrassment [$M_s = 4.26$ and 1.74 , respectively; $t(16) = 6.98$, $P < .01$] and amusement [$M_s = 5.45$ and 1.66 , respectively, $t(16) = 7.32$, $P < .01$]. Observers attributed equal prosocial and antisocial character to individuals who displayed no emotion [$M_s = 3.04$ and 3.09 , respectively, $t(16) = -.14$, ns], and as one would expect, more antisocial than prosocial character to the individual displaying anger [$M_s = 4.50$ and 2.05 , respectively, $t(16) = -7.39$, $P < .01$]. The shame display did not evoke inferences of more prosocial than antisocial character [$M_s = 2.94$ and 2.59 , respectively, $t(16) = 1.11$, ns], nor did shame evoke more prosocial character inferences than the neutral expression [$M_s = 2.94$ and 3.04 , respectively, $t(16) = .37$, ns], which we suspect has to do with the fact that the violation, tripping in public, is relatively insignificant, whereas shame tends to be associated with more serious violations. In contrast, the embarrassment display evoked more prosocial character inferences than the neutral expression [$M_s = 4.26$ and 3.04 , respectively, $t(16) = 3.49$, $P < .01$] as did the amusement display [$M_s = 5.45$ and 3.04 , respectively, $t(16) = 5.72$, $P < .01$].

Human appeasement displays and apologies lead to reconciliation in part by evoking sympathy, concern, forgiveness, and amusement in others [Tavuchis, 1991]. Consistent with this perspective, embarrassment displays increase interpersonal liking, much as

nonhuman appeasement gestures increase affiliative interactions [de Waal, 1988]. For example, people who have made mistakes, such as knocking over a supermarket display, children facing their parents following transgressions, and even politicians running for office, are all liked more and punished less when they display embarrassment and other submissive behavior than when they display neutral behavior [Edelmann, 1982; Masters, 1988; Semin and Manstead, 1982; Semin and Papadopoulou, 1990].

Study 3 and Study 4 addressed whether embarrassment and shame displays actually evoke different reconciliation-related emotions in observers, as our conceptual analysis would suggest. Participants were asked to imagine that each person in the photo had committed a social transgression (in Study 3, tripping in public; in Study 4, failing in a class presentation) and after viewing the expression they rated how much amusement, antipathy (anger, contempt, and disgust), and sympathy (concern, forgiveness, and sympathy) they felt in response to the individual in the photo on 7-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*). Figure 5 illustrates the emotions observers reported in response to the five expressions in the condition in which observers imagined that each poser had just tripped.

As expected, embarrassment displays elicited higher levels of amusement than shame




Fig. 5. Emotional response to displays of individual who tripped.

displays [$M_s = 4.45$ and 2.45 , respectively, $t(9) = 4.97$, $P < .01$], an emotion that leads observers to make light of transgressions [Cupach and Metts, 1990] and increases social approach [Keltner and Bonanno, in press]. In contrast, shame displays elicited noticeably higher levels of sympathy than did the embarrassment display [$M_s = 4.47$ and 2.48 , respectively, $t(9) = 4.06$, $P < .01$], which motivates altruistic helping behavior [Eisenberg et al., 1989] and would be appropriate for rectifying the more serious transgressions associated with shame. Figure 6 presents observers' self-rated emotions to the five expressions following a more serious transgression: the failure at an academic presentation.

In the context of a more serious transgression, shame displays elicited emotions that would be more likely to lead to reconciliation. Shame displays evoked greater sympathy than the displays of embarrassment [$M_s = 4.57$ and 1.88 , respectively, $t(11) = 5.51$, $P < .01$] and amusement [$M_s = 4.57$ and 1.67 , respectively, $t(11) = 7.76$, $P < .01$]. Other findings further illustrate that appeasement displays are more effective when appropriate to the situation. Observers felt relatively little antipathy in response to the embarrassment display associated with someone who had tripped ($M = 1.23$) and greater sympathy ($M = 2.48$), but more elevated antipathy ($M = 2.50$) and reduced sympathy




Fig. 6. Emotional response to displays of individual who failed in a class presentation.

($M = 1.88$) in response to the same display when it was associated with an individual failing at a presentation.

In sum, we have proposed that embarrassment and shame are reactive forms of appeasement that appease observers of different transgressions. The evidence we have reviewed supports this formulation: Embarrassment and shame, once commonly considered to be in the same emotion category, were shown to follow different kinds of transgressions and to be signaled by distinct appeasement-related displays that evoke different emotions in observers, most notably amusement and sympathy, that lead to social reconciliation.

ANTICIPATORY FORMS OF APPEASEMENT: POLITE MODESTY AND SHYNESS

As prone as humans are to social mistakes and conflict, they are equally skilled at avoiding conflict, and do so, we contend, in part through two anticipatory forms of appeasement—polite modesty and shyness. In making connections between polite modesty, shyness, and appeasement, we will selectively review relevant theory and empirical findings to determine whether politeness/modesty and shyness a) occur in conditions in which the likelihood of conflict is increased, b) are marked by appeasement behavior and experience, and c) have the effect of preventing aggression and increasing social approach.

Politeness

Politeness is a system of rules that governs public behavior in ways that allow individuals to maintain cooperative and respectful relations [Brown and Levinson, 1987; Elias, 1978; Visser, 1991]. Politeness encompasses diverse activities and behaviors, which include manners of eating, addressing others, conversing, sitting, and negotiating physical distance, space, and the allocation of resources. At the core of polite practices is the concept of modesty. Modesty is a strategy of social interaction and feeling that revolves around the inhibition of inappropriate impulses, especially those that encroach upon the rights of others, restricted claims regarding the self, and, by implication, deference towards others' needs [Darwin, 1872; Goffman, 1967].

Although there are several functions of politeness, including the demarcation of class differences [Elias, 1978], an analysis of the conditions, behavior, and experience of politeness points to its possible appeasement functions. The conditions in which politeness is most likely are similar to those requiring appeasement, typically revolving around interactions with strangers in public settings and the distribution of resources [Elias, 1978; Visser, 1991], both of which involve the increased likelihood of conflict. For example, one elaborate system of rules of politeness revolves around eating publicly, when the division of food could elicit potential conflict [Visser, 1991]. To peacefully negotiate the allocation of food, humans have developed elaborate rules of table manners that dictate deference to others' needs and the restraint of impulses [Elias, 1978].

Like other kinds of appeasement, polite modesty is expressed in submissive, affiliative, and inhibited behavior. Gaze aversion, bowing the head, postural restriction, and speech hesitation are polite and modest, whereas staring, raising the head with jaw thrusting forward, postural expansion, and assertion in speech are immodest and impolite [Brown and Levinson, 1987]. Interestingly, the polite smiles of strangers passing by, individuals about to eat dinner, or individuals holding a door open often involve the lip press

and gaze aversion, much like the embarrassment display. The feeling of being polite is one of inhibition, modesty, self-consciousness, self-deprecation, and deference. It is these feelings, Elias contends, that motivate people to inhibit untoward impulses that ultimately, as Goffman noted in analyzing demeanor, “afford sacredness to others involved in the ceremonial order” [Goffman, 1967].

Finally, polite modesty increases social approach and cooperation and reduces aggressive tendencies. The sociologist Goffman argued that polite modesty and appropriate deference and demeanor bestow respect, power, and honor on others, which ultimately increase social harmony and cooperation, the ultimate goals of appeasement. In sum, polite modesty incorporates appeasement-like behavior and experience in contexts in which conflict and aggression are more likely.

Shyness

Shyness is defined as a personality trait that includes characteristic patterns of a) social perception, especially the exaggerated senses of social inefficacy and failure; b) experience, including fear, anxiety, and wariness of strangers; and c), behavior, including inhibited action [Buss, 1980; Cheek and Briggs, 1990]. Individual differences in shyness are manifest early in life and are relatively stable over the life course [Kagan and Snidman, 1991].

Recent theorists have begun to conceptualize one facet of shyness as the disposition to appease. Shyness and social anxiety have been related to the tendencies to “recruit submissive options in various social encounters” [Gilbert and Trower, 1990] and to protect the self from harsh judgment or social failure [Shepperd and Arkin, 1990]. Consistent with these claims, findings suggest that shyness shares the conditions, behavior, and social consequences of appeasement.

Shyness, as Darwin [1872, p 329] originally observed, is most acutely felt in interactions with strangers and in which self-assertion is required—both conditions in which the individual is potentially exposed to harsh judgment and aggression [Cheek and Briggs, 1990]. The behavioral markers of shyness, now documented in studies of childhood and adult shyness [Asendorpf, 1990], like appeasement behavior, are submissive and inhibited in nature. Shy individuals are prone to a) avert their gaze, b) touch their face (a marker of embarrassment), c) engage in cooperative, nonintrusive speech styles that include many back-channel responses (nods of the head, “uh-huhs”), d) smile, and e) inhibit gestural expression [for review, see Asendorpf, 1990]. Finally, shyness is associated with the personal experience of low self and social esteem, limited social capacities, and submissive social positions, much like appeasement [Cheek and Briggs, 1990; Gilbert and Trower, 1990].

Why then do shy people have greater social difficulties [Kagan and Snidman, 1991], if they are indeed more prone to appeasement behavior? One possibility is that it is the other markers and underlying tendencies of shyness, such as anxious, fearful, and avoidant behavior, that produce the social difficulties associated with shyness. A second possibility is that shy individuals display inappropriate appeasement behavior, either in its kind, frequency, or intensity, which may not enhance social bonds, as suggested by certain findings from Study 3 and Study 4. Finally, it has been speculated that shyness may curb the individual’s egoistic impulses and actions to the detriment of the individual, but to the benefit of group harmony and cooperation [Ford, 1987]. These sorts of questions await empirical investigation.

SOCIAL PROCESSES THAT ENCOURAGE APPEASEMENT

We have proposed that a family of related emotions, social strategies, and personality characteristics serve appeasement functions. Interestingly, certain rituals center around appeasement, reconciliation, and related states such as embarrassment and shame, including socialization and punishment [Ausubel, 1955] as well as group initiation and hazing rituals [de Waal, 1988; Lutz and White, 1986; Sabini, 1994]. In our own research, we have focused on teasing, a universal and diverse social practice [Brown, 1991; Pawluk, 1989; Schaefer, 1978; Shapiro et al., 1991].

We proposed, like others before us [e.g., de Waal, 1988], that in teasing individuals point out mistakes and flaws in each other, momentarily introducing conflict and social distance, and then reestablish cooperative bonds through appeasement and reconciliation. To test these ideas, we had low- and high-status fraternity members in a first study and romantic partners in a second study [Keltner et al., 1997] tease one another by making up nicknames and stories about one another—common elements of teasing [Leech, 1983; Pawluk, 1989]. Consistent with our first claim, fraternity members and romantic partners teased each other about norm deviations and character flaws, thus pointing out important norms to adhere to but creating momentary social distance [Groos, 1901; Shapiro et al., 1991]. Participants restored and enhanced their bonds by delivering the seemingly hostile tease with playful markers, such as unusual facial expressions and vocalizations, and appeasement-related submissive postures and displays, which reduced the threat posed by the tease and evoked affiliative interactions, including mutual laughter, and in the case of romantic partners, flirtation. Illustrative of the evocative properties that we have attributed to appeasement displays, targets' submissive behavior was related to the teasers' positive emotion in the fraternity study, and romantic partners who delivered their teases and responded to being teased in more submissive, deferential ways elicited more positive emotion in their partners and were found to have more satisfying relations 6 months later.

There are several other such appeasement-based social practices that we believe have similar effects on social relations and are worthy of study. These include stories of self-deprecation, leader "roasts," and friendly forms of humiliation, that in spite of their momentarily painful qualities improve social relations in the long run.

SOCIAL PROCESSES THAT PREVENT APPEASEMENT

Certain social practices prevent appeasement from occurring, to the detriment of social relations. One important institution that may unnecessarily limit the role of appeasement processes is the Western European judicial system [Moore, 1993], in which criminals are often instructed not to apologize for their actions to avoid conviction. This tendency has at least two unfortunate consequences. First, preventing defendants from displaying appeasement may actually increase the punitive severity of the judicial system, which has certain societal and financial costs. Studies of mock juries or actual trials find, for example, that defendants who show signs of sadness and remorse are less likely to be convicted and receive shorter sentences [Savitsky and Sim, 1974]. A recent mock trial study we conducted found that a defendant convicted of selling drugs who showed embarrassment and shame was judged to be less guilty, received a shorter sentence, and was nominated as eligible for parole earlier than the

same defendant who showed neutral behavior or contempt [Young and Keltner, 1996]. These findings are presented in Figure 7.

The second unfortunate consequence of preventing appeasement in the judicial system pertains to reform and recidivism. Studies find that individuals who violate social rules and are allowed to appease the victim and go through the process of reconciliation are less likely to subsequently engage in deviant behavior. For example, the Family Group Conference brings together juvenile offenders, their victims, and the respective families to go through the process of appeasement, typically denied by the Western judicial system, and has dramatically reduced recidivism in Australia [Moore, 1993]

We believe there are many societal and institutional contexts in which appeasement is prevented or strategically avoided. For example, it is common for negotiating parties to avoid displaying weakness [Schelling, 1960], to demonstrate strength, and to avoid face-to-face interactions [Gahagan, 1970; Morley and Stephenson, 1977], suggesting that appeasement displays are avoided during negotiations. This general approach to negotiations may likewise escalate conflict and reduce the likelihood of mutually satisfying settlements.




Fig. 7. Prison sentencing and parole judgments of defendants displaying contempt, a neutral expression, and appeasement-related behavior.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we have focused on identifying the appeasement functions of embarrassment, shame, polite modesty, and shyness. Our review identified the similarities in the conditions, concomitant behavior, and affiliative consequences of appeasement and embarrassment, shame, polite modesty, and shyness. This review has shown that appeasement and reconciliation interactions, well documented in other species [e.g., de Waal, 1988], underpin the very emotions, social strategies, and personalities that establish and promote harmonious social relations.

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