Can We Reduce Political Antagonism by Promoting Trust?

The left and right don’t agree on much, but many on both sides do agree on one thing: the system is broken.

Over the past decade, anti-system political movements have surged, from Brexit in 2015 to Donald Trump’s election in 2024. Across Europe, resentment of mainstream institutions has grown. But this trend isn’t new. Both far-left and far-right populist parties in the West have been gaining ground since the 1980s.

What is populism? According to political scientist Cas Mudde, that’s the idea that society is separated into two groups at odds with one another: the common people and the corrupt elite.

The 2025 World Happiness Report identifies a fundamental driver of this trend: declining happiness and social trust. According to the report, low life satisfaction is strongly linked to anti-system attitudes, while a person’s level of social trust determines whether they lean toward far-left or far-right populist movements.

Traditionally, political scientists explained voting behavior through ideology, economics, and class struggle. But today’s political landscape defies these explanations. In 2023, 19% of young adults worldwide reported having no one they could count on for social support—a 39% increase since 2006. Meanwhile, social trust has plummeted. In the U.S., the percentage of people who believe that “most people can be trusted” has dropped from 50% in the 1970s to just 30% today.

This erosion of trust has fueled resentment toward elites, institutions, and even fellow citizens. It has also driven conspiracy theories, skepticism toward mainstream media, and hostility toward immigrants. As trust diminishes, people are more likely to see social and economic change as threats rather than opportunities—making them vulnerable to populist rhetoric. And when people feel unhappy with their lives, they become more inclined to reject political institutions.

The rise of anti-system votes

The World Happiness Report draws on data from the Gallup World Poll, the European Social Survey, and the General Social Survey, revealing a strong correlation between declining happiness and rising support for extremist parties.

Researchers measured happiness by asking respondents, “Are you satisfied with your life in general?” on a scale from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). They measured social trust—the trust people have in others—by asking, “In general, would you say that most people can be trusted, or can one never be too careful when dealing with others?”

The results show a clear pattern: Those with low trust in others tend to gravitate toward right-wing populism, while those with higher social trust are more likely to support the far left.

Economic studies reinforce this finding. Interpersonal trust plays a key role in shaping citizens’ willingness to finance public goods, pay taxes, or support redistributive policies. This helps explain why a large segment of the working class—who report the lowest levels of life satisfaction—often votes for parties that oppose redistribution of wealth.

Why some turn to the right, others to the left

Right-wing populist parties—such as the Sweden Democrats, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia—build their platforms on nationalism, anti-immigration rhetoric, and economic protectionism. Their supporters experience both low life satisfaction and low social trust. These voters not only distrust elites and institutions but also harbor deep distrust toward fellow citizens, immigrants, and marginalized groups.

On the other hand, far-left voters—such as supporters of France’s La France Insoumise—tend to be unhappy but maintain higher levels of social trust. They are more likely to support redistributive policies, multiculturalism, and inclusive governance. Indeed, social trust is the main predictor of the cultural divide in attitudes toward homosexuality and immigration.

The key difference between these two groups is how they perceive society. While both reject the current system, far-left voters believe in collective solutions, but far-right voters have a more individualistic, protectionist view.

By contrast, voters for center-left and center-right parties tend to report higher life satisfaction. Crucially, while low trust is strongly linked to far-right populism, it has little to no connection to leftist movements, according to this work.

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Social trust also appears as the main predictor of the ideological divide in terms of income redistribution. Researchers in the report measured attitudes toward income redistribution using the question “Government should reduce differences in income levels” (1–10 scale) in Europe and “Incomes should be made more equal” (1–10 scale) in the U.S.

The report showed that support for income redistribution is generally associated with higher social trust and lower life satisfaction. Those who are highly satisfied but less trusting are the ones who most often oppose income redistribution. The contrast is more evident for citizens with the lowest life satisfaction. They are less supportive of income redistribution if they have a low level of social trust and more in favor if they trust others. Citizens with low trust may be skeptical of the social contract and doubt reciprocity from others.

The backbone of the populist movement

The World Happiness Report identifies four groups who have experienced the most significant declines in life satisfaction and social trust—making them the most likely to shift toward anti-system politics:

• Young people: those under 30 have seen the sharpest drop in life satisfaction. Economic insecurity, social isolation, and uncertainty about the future are major factors.
• Less educated: those with lower levels of education have faced greater economic instability.
• Rural voters: who have experienced economic decline, reduced public services, and cultural displacement.
• Financially insecure individuals: those struggling to make ends meet report the largest drops in life satisfaction and trust.

These groups demonstrate why similar socioeconomic backgrounds can produce starkly different outcomes. For example, in France’s 2022 presidential election, both far-left (Mélenchon) and far-right (Le Pen) candidates attracted blue-collar workers, despite vastly different policies. The deciding factor wasn’t economic status—it was social trust.

To better understand these trends, the report categorizes voters based on their levels of life satisfaction and social trust:

• High life satisfaction and high trust: Most satisfied with democracy, these individuals tend to support centrist, establishment parties.
• High life satisfaction and low trust: Skeptical of institutions but personally content, this group often favors libertarian or conservative ideologies.
• Low life satisfaction and high trust: Drawn to far-left movements, these voters believe in redistributive policies and collective solutions.
• Low life satisfaction and low trust: The core base of right-wing populism, this group distrusts both the system and other people.

The American abstainer exception

This framework is more difficult to apply in the American two-party system, but the World Happiness Report manages to build a strong case. In a multi-party system, voters can choose—or create—a party based on their preferences and intersections. That isn’t a possibility in the United States, which protects both the Democrats and Republicans from splintering.

But focusing on the two presidential elections in 2016 and 2020, when there was an upsurge of votes for Trump, the researchers did uncover a great schism.

Those who abstain from voting display the lowest levels of life satisfaction and social trust. In two-party systems, parties often take opposite positions on big policy issues, which can feed polarization. To test that framework, the researchers tried to identify the subgroups who aligned on policy to understand their characteristics and their voting behavior in the U.S. elections.

In the 2016 U.S. election, Hillary Clinton’s Democratic supporters fell into the “high life satisfaction and high trust” category; they were wealthier, had high life satisfaction, and trusted institutions, making them more supportive of globalization and immigration. Bernie Sanders’s Democratic voters, while also trusting, had lower life satisfaction, aligning with his redistributive policies; they fell into the “low life satisfaction and high trust” category.

In 2016, Trump Republican voters, by contrast, fell into the “high life satisfaction and low trust” category; they exhibited low trust but slightly higher life satisfaction, combining both working-class and wealthy demographics, which aligned with his anti-tax and anti-immigration stance. By 2020, Trump consolidated Republican support, increasing life satisfaction among his base.

Importantly, those who abstained from voting had the lowest levels of both life satisfaction and trust. They fell into the last category, “low life satisfaction and low trust.” Researchers also looked at a 2021 survey conducted by market research firm Bilendi to examine voting behavior in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. elections, with metrics around life satisfaction, trust, and ideology.

The findings highlight a stark divide between voters and those who abstained. Abstainers reported greater social isolation, lower life satisfaction, and diminished optimism for the future, with their well-being getting worse between elections. They also consistently showed lower trust—in personal relationships and broader society. Abstainers also expressed deep skepticism toward institutions, including courts, police, and government, with trust in these entities declining further between 2016 and 2020.

The most striking result concerns the differences between trust in one’s private circle (family, friends, and neighbors) and trust in larger society. Democratic voters have a lower-than-average level of inner group trust, but a much higher-than-average level of trust in strangers. The picture is reversed among Trump voters. This result applies to all generations and education levels.

Thus, suggests this research, addressing the polarization crisis requires policies that go beyond economic redistribution. Efforts to rebuild community engagement, restore faith in democratic institutions, and foster interpersonal trust are key to reversing this trend. Without such interventions, the erosion of happiness and trust will continue to fuel political division.