Subjective Well-Being

The Science of Happiness and Life Satisfaction

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Definition of Subjective Well-Being

Since ancient times humans have wondered about what makes a good life. Scientists who study subjective well-being assume that an essential ingredient of the good life is that the person herself likes her life. Subjective well-being is defined as a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life. These evaluations include emotional reactions to events as well as cognitive judgments of satisfaction and fulfillment. Thus, subjective well-being is a broad concept that includes experiencing pleasant emotions, low levels of negative moods, and high life satisfaction. The positive experiences embodied in high subjective well-being are a core concept of positive psychology because they make life rewarding.

History

Throughout history, philosophers and religious leaders have suggested that diverse characteristics, such as love, wisdom, and nonattachment, are the cardinal elements of a fulfilled existence. Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham, however, argued that the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain are the defining characteristics of a good life (1789/1948). Thus, the Utilitarians were the intellectual forerunners of subjective well-being researchers, focusing on the emotional, mental, and physical pleasures and pains that individuals experience. Although there are other desirable personal characteristics beyond whether a person is happy, the individual with abundant joy has one key ingredient of a good life.

Early in the 20th century, empirical studies of subjective well-being began to take shape. As early as 1925, Flugel studied moods by having people record their emotional events and then summing emotional reactions across moments. Flugel’s work was the forerunner of modern experience sampling approaches to measuring subjective well-being on-line as people go about their everyday lives. After World War II, survey researchers began polling people about their happiness and life satisfaction using simple global survey questionnaires. The pollsters studied large numbers of people who were often selected to produce representative samples of
nations. George Gallup, Gerald Gurin and his colleagues, and Hadley Cantril pioneered the use of large-scale surveys as an assessment technique. They asked people questions such as "How happy are you?" with simple response options varying from "very happy" to "not very happy." Recently, Diener (2000a) proposed that a national index be created in which subjective well-being would be tracked over time.

Although early subjective well-being studies were characterized by very short scales, many important discoveries were made. In 1969, for example, Norman Bradburn showed that pleasant and unpleasant affect are somewhat independent and have different correlates—they are not simply opposites of one another. Thus, the two affects must be studied separately to gain a complete picture of individuals' well-being. This finding had important implications for the field of subjective well-being: it showed that clinical psychology's attempts to eliminate negative states would not necessarily foster positive states. The elimination of pain may not result in a corresponding increase in pleasure; ridding the world of sadness and anxiety will not necessarily make it a happy place.

Wilson reviewed the meager amount of research on "avowed happiness" in 1967, and Diener (1984) provided a review of the much larger database on subjective well-being that had accumulated by the mid-1980s. By that time, the field was becoming a science. Since Diener's review was published, a number of books have appeared on the topic of subjective well-being (e.g., Argyle, 1987; Myers, 1982; Strack, Argyle, & Schwarz, 1991), and in 1999, Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith authored a new review of the literature in Psychological Bulletin. A handbook volume of chapters related to hedonic psychology (Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999) and a book dedicated to cross-cultural differences in subjective well-being (Diener & Suh, 2000) also provide more thorough reviews of this area.

The scientific discipline of subjective well-being grows rapidly. One reason for this is that people in the Western nations have achieved a level of material abundance and health that allows them to go beyond mere survival in seeking the good life. People around the globe are entering a "postmaterialistic" world, in which they are concerned with issues of quality of life beyond economic prosperity. Subjective well-being also is popular because it is particularly democratic—it grants respect to what people think and feel about their lives. People are not content to have experts evaluate their lives; they believe that their opinions matter. In addition, the study of subjective well-being flourished because of the growing trend toward individualism around the globe. Individualists are concerned with their own feelings and beliefs, and thus the study of subjective well-being corresponds well with the Western zeitgeist. Finally, the field increased in popularity because researchers succeeded in developing scientific methods for studying subjective well-being. For these reasons the scientific study of subjective well-being is now poised to grow into a major scholarly and applied discipline.

**Measurement**

Early survey instruments usually posed a single question about people's happiness or life satisfaction. Psychometric evaluations of these simple scales showed that they possess a degree of validity. For example, Andrews and Withey (1976) found that global questions about people's overall evaluation of their lives yielded scores that converged well with one another. As the field matured, more multi-item scales appeared, with greater reliability and validity than the single-item instruments. Lucas, Diener, and Suh (1996) demonstrated that multi-item life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect scales formed factors that were separable from each other, as well as from other constructs such as self-esteem. A number of happiness, affect, and life satisfaction measures are now available (see Andrews & Robinson, 1992, for a review), and we present the five-item Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Pavot & Diener, 1993) in the appendix.

A major concern of researchers in the field is whether self-report instruments are valid. After all, people might report that they are happy yet not truly experience high subjective well-being. Sandvik, Diener, and Seidlitz (1993) found that the self-report measures converge with other types of assessment, including expert ratings based on interviews with respondents, experience sampling measures in which feelings are reported at random moments in everyday life, participants' memory for positive versus negative events in their lives, the reports of family and friends, and smiling. Despite the positive psychometric qualities of global subjective well-
being measures, however, we recommend a multimethod battery to assess subjective well-being when this is possible. Additional assessment devices based on memory, informant reports, and experience sampling are likely to supplement the information obtained from global measures and guard against response artifacts, and in some cases the alternative measures may yield different answers about who is happiest (e.g., Oishi, 2000).

The use of multiple methods also allows researchers to understand how people construct subjective well-being judgments. Schwarz, Strack, and their colleagues, for example, showed that situational variables can exert a substantial impact on life satisfaction and mood reports (Schwarz & Strack, 1999). Schwarz and Strack’s findings illustrate that life satisfaction judgments are not immutable, stored values that are reported when requested. Instead, respondents seem to use currently salient information to construct life satisfaction judgments. Building on this finding, Diener and his colleagues (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998) showed that certain information is chronically salient to some individuals but not to others (Suh & Diener, 1999). Thus, any single piece of information may or may not be used by an individual to construct her or his life satisfaction judgments. For instance, people in individualistic nations may base their life satisfaction judgments on the extent to which they feel high self-esteem, whereas people in collectivistic cultures may base their judgments on the opinions of other people (Diener & Diener, 1995). Thus, a person may use both situationally induced and chronically salient information to construct life satisfaction judgments.

People also may use different metastrategies in seeking the information upon which to base their life satisfaction judgments. For example, some people may search for information about the positive aspects of their lives, whereas others might seek information about problematic areas (Diener et al., in press). Likewise, people differ in the degree to which they weigh their moods and emotions when calculating life satisfaction judgments (Suh & Diener, 1999). Thus, life satisfaction reflects different information for different people and can change depending on what is salient at the moment.

When participants report on any aspect of global subjective well-being, they must construct a judgment about their well-being. This constructed judgment may not faithfully correspond to the average mood or level of satisfaction experienced across many different moments. Thomas and Diener (1990) found only a modest match between people’s reports of momentary moods and their recall of those moods. Thus, estimates of happiness and reports of affect over time are likely to be influenced by a person’s current mood, his or her beliefs about happiness, and the ease of retrieving positive and negative information.

A fascinating picture of subjective well-being is emerging in which we can differentiate between a person’s momentary feelings and thoughts about well-being, and larger, more global constructions. At the momentary level, we can examine people’s reports of moods, pleasures, pains, and satisfactions recorded online through the experience sampling method. For example, in our laboratory we use palm-sized computers to signal people randomly. When signaled, respondents complete a survey of their feelings at that moment. Kahneman (1999) suggested that these types of data offer the most accurate estimate of subjective well-being because they are less distorted by artifacts and biases.

Global reports of subjective well-being also are valuable, however, because they offer an insight into the fascinating psychological processes by which people construct global judgments about their lives. In global reports of subjective well-being, we discover how a person summarizes her or his life as a whole, and this synopsis may only be moderately correlated with on-line reports. For example, we find that people in cultures where subjective well-being is valued are more likely to weight their most positive domains in calculating a global life satisfaction judgment; people in cultures in which happiness is not an important value are more likely to weight their most negative domains in calculating a life satisfaction judgment (Diener, 2000b). If people believe that life satisfaction is desirable, they may be more likely to search for positive information when reporting global life satisfaction judgments. Thus, the relation between satisfaction with specific domains such as work and satisfaction with life as a whole is likely to be more dependent on people’s beliefs about what types of information should be considered when judging life in its entirety. In a sense, then, these are two varieties of happiness and satisfaction—evaluations of specific aspects of life and on-line at-the-moment feelings of well-
being versus larger, global judgments about one's happiness and satisfaction.

Theoretical Approach

Many theories of happiness have been proposed since Aristotle's brilliant insights. These theories can be categorized into three groups: (1) need and goal satisfaction theories, (2) process or activity theories, and (3) genetic and personality predisposition theories. The first constellation of theories centers around the idea that the reduction of tensions (e.g., the elimination of pain and the satisfaction of biological and psychological needs) leads to happiness. Freud's (1933/1976) pleasure principle and Maslow's (1970) hierarchical needs model represent this approach. In support of this view, Omoe and Wearing (1990) found that the degree to which individuals' needs were met was positively associated with the degree of their life satisfaction.

Goal theorists argue that individuals attain subjective well-being when they move toward an ideal state or accomplish a valued aim (the standard). Other researchers have extended this idea to incorporate the degree of discrepancy from other potential comparison standards. For example, Michalos (1985) postulated that happiness is inversely related to the degree of discrepancy from multiple standards, including what one wants, what one has had in the past, and what relevant others have. Likewise, Higgins (1987) posited that discrepancies from one's "ideal self" and one's "ought self" lead to the experiences of negative emotions. Need and goal satisfaction theorists argue that the reduction of tension and satisfaction of biological and psychological needs and goals will cause happiness.

One implication of tension-reduction theories is that happiness occurs after needs are met and goals are fulfilled. In other words, happiness is a desired end state toward which all activity is directed. These theories can be compared with models of happiness in which engagement in an activity itself provides happiness. Most notably, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) suggested that people are happiest when they are engaged in interesting activities that match their level of skill. He called the state of mind that results from this matching of challenges and skill "flow," and argued that people who often experience flow tend to be very happy. Similarly, Cantor and her colleagues (Cantor & Blanton, 1996; Harlow & Cantor, 1996) emphasized the importance of active participation in life tasks. For instance, Harlow and Cantor (1996) found that social participation was a strong predictor of life satisfaction for retired elders. Sheldon, Ryan, and Reis (1996) found that people were happiest on days when they engaged in activities for intrinsic reasons (because of the fun and enjoyment). Goal researchers (e.g., Emmons, 1986; Little, 1989) agree that having important goals and pursuing them are reliable indicators of well-being, and therefore goal theories can combine the elements of tension reduction and pleasurable activity in explaining subjective well-being. People who have important goals tend to be more energetic, experience more positive emotions, and feel that life is meaningful (e.g., McGregor & Little, 1998).

Both needs theorists and activity theorists argue that subjective well-being will change with the conditions in people's lives. When individuals are approaching their goals or are engaged in interesting activities, they should experience positive well-being. However, other theorists argue that there is an element of stability in people's levels of well-being that cannot be explained by the stability in the conditions of people's lives. These theorists argue that subjective well-being is strongly influenced by stable personality dispositions.

Subjective well-being judgments reflect cognitive and emotional reactions to life circumstances. Because circumstances can be short-lived and changeable or relatively stable, researchers study both momentary and long-term subjective well-being. Not surprisingly, momentary levels of affect fluctuate quite a bit. For example, Diener and Larsen (1984) found that when people's emotions were sampled at random times throughout the day, a single report of momentary pleasant affect on average correlated only about .10 with pleasant affect in other random moments. People react to changing circumstances, and these reactions are reflected in momentary reports of subjective well-being.

Although it is difficult to predict how happy an individual will be at any given moment, when affect is averaged across many occasions, stable patterns of individual differences emerge. For example, Diener and Larsen (1984) reported that mean levels of pleasant affect experienced in work situations correlated .74 with average levels of pleasant affect experienced in recreation situations. Similarly, average life satisfac-
tion in social situations correlated .92 with average life satisfaction when alone. Based on these results, it appears that although emotions fluctuate, individuals do have characteristic emotional responses to a variety of situations and life circumstances. These characteristic emotional responses are also moderately to strongly stable across long periods of time. Magnus and Diener (1991) found a correlation of .58 between life satisfaction measures assessed over a 4-year interval. Costa and McCrae (1988) reported substantial stability coefficients for affective components of subjective well-being over a period of 6 years.

These results have led some theorists to suggest that although life events can influence subjective well-being, people eventually adapt to these changes and return to biologically determined "set points" or "adaptation levels" (e.g., Headey & Wearing, 1992). For instance, Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, and Diener (1993) found that stability in subjective well-being was comparable among people whose income went up, down, or stayed the same over 10 years. Similarly, Costa, McCrae, and Zonderman (1987) reported that people who lived in stable circumstances were no more stable than people who experienced major life changes (e.g., divorce, widowhood, or job loss).

One reason for the stability and consistency of subjective well-being is that there is a substantial genetic component to it; to some degree people are born prone to be happy or unhappy. Tellegen et al. (1988), for example, examined monozygotic twins who were reared apart and compared them with dizygotic twins who were reared apart, as well as with monozygotic and dizygotic twins who were raised together. After comparing the similarities of the various types of twins, Tellegen et al. estimated that 40% of the variability in positive emotionality and 55% of the variability in negative emotionality could be predicted by genetic variation. These estimates allow for environmental influences, but genes do appear to influence characteristic emotional responses to life circumstances.

When one examines personality influences in more detail, the traits that are most consistently linked to subjective well-being are extraversion and neuroticism (Diener & Lucas, 1999). Lucas and Fujita (2000) used meta-analytic and confirmatory factor analytic techniques to show that extraversion is consistently correlated moderately to strongly with pleasant affect; and Fujita (1991) found that neuroticism and negative affect are indistinguishable after controlling for measurement error. While other personality traits from the Five Factor Model (e.g., agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience) do correlate with subjective well-being, these relations are smaller and less consistent (see, e.g., Watson & Clark, 1992). Thus, it can be said that an extraverted non-neurotic has a head start in achieving happiness, but that other traits, as well as life circumstances, matter as well.

Differences in subjective well-being also result from stable individual differences in how people think about the world. Differences in the accessibility of pleasant versus unpleasant information, as well as the accuracy and efficiency with which people process pleasant versus unpleasant information influence subjective well-being. Certain people attend to and recall the pleasant aspects of life more than others. Similarly, certain cognitive dispositions such as hope (Snyder et al., 1991), dispositional optimism (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1993), and expectancy for control (Grob, Stetsenko, Sabatier, Botcheva, & Macek, 1999) appear to influence subjective well-being. It is not just who we are that matters to happiness, but how we think about our lives.

Current Findings

Demographic Correlates of Subjective Well-Being

The strong association between temperament and subjective well-being does not mean that events and circumstances are irrelevant to people’s subjective well-being. In the first major review of happiness, Wilson (1967) showed that both personality and demographic factors correlate with subjective well-being. He stated that the happy person is a “young, healthy, well-educated, well-paid, extroverted, optimistic, worry-free, religious, married person with high self-esteem, job morale, modest aspirations, of either sex and of a wide range of intelligence” (p. 294). However, Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) studied the well-being of Americans and found that demographic variables such as age, income, and education did not account for much variance in reports of well-being, echoing earlier findings by Bradburn (1969) and others. In the past 30 years, researchers systematically cataloged the various demographic
correlates of subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999), with a number of replicable findings emerging: (a) demographic factors such as age, sex, and income are related to subjective well-being; (b) these effects are usually small; and (c) most people are moderately happy, and thus, demographic factors tend to distinguish between people who are moderately happy and those who are very happy (Diener & Diener, 1996).

Income, for example, is consistently related to subjective well-being in both within-nation (e.g., Diener et al., 1993; Haring, Stock, & Okun, 1984) and between-nation analyses (e.g., Diener et al., 1993); but at both the individual and the national level, income change over time has little net effect on subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1993; Diener & Suh, 1998). Goals and expectations must be taken into account to understand the relation between income and subjective well-being; the benefits of a rising income are offset if one's material desires increase even faster than wealth.

Age and sex are related to subjective well-being, but these effects are small, too, and depend on the component of subjective well-being being measured. For example, in an international sample of 40 nations, Diener and Suh (1998) found that although pleasant affect declined across age cohorts, life satisfaction and unpleasant affect showed little change. In two separate international samples consisting of approximately 40 nations each, Lucas and Gohm (2000) found that sex differences in subjective well-being were small (only about one fifth of a standard deviation difference), with women reporting greater unpleasant and pleasant affect (though only significant differences in unpleasant affect were replicated across both international samples). Based on these results, one could not simply say that men are happier than women or that the young are happier than the old. The conclusion depends on the component of subjective well-being that is measured. Diener et al. (1999) argued that if theory in this area is to progress, researchers must study the separable components of subjective well-being—"happiness" is not a single thing.

Similarly, researchers must be careful about the conceptualization and measurement of independent variables. For example, Wilson (1967) concluded that physical health is correlated with subjective well-being. However, recent findings qualify this conclusion: The relation depends on whether self-report or objective ratings of health are assessed. Although self-reported health correlates positively with subjective well-being (e.g., Okun, Stock, & Haring, 1984), the correlation is weak when objective health ratings are examined (Watten, Vassend, Myhrer, & Syversen, 1997). Subjective well-being influences the subjective perception of health, and this inflates the correlation between subjective well-being and subjective health. It appears that the way people perceive the world is much more important to happiness than objective circumstances.

Other demographic characteristics such as marital status and religious activity are also positively correlated with subjective well-being; but the effects of marriage can differ for men and women, and the effects of religious activity may depend on the specific type of religiosity being assessed. Thus, the answer to whether particular demographic factors increase subjective well-being is likely dependent on people's values and goals, personality, and culture.

Culture and Subjective Well-Being

In recent years, cultural differences in subjective well-being (see Diener & Suh, 2000) have been explored, with a realization that there are profound differences in what makes people happy. Self-esteem, for example, is less strongly associated with life satisfaction (Diener & Diener, 1995), and extraversion is less strongly associated with pleasant affect (Lucas, Diener, Grob, Suh, & Shao, 2000) in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures. Similarly, Suh (1999) found that there are cultural differences in the importance of personality congruence. Personality congruence reflects the extent to which a person's behaviors are consistent across situations and with the person's inner feelings. Although the importance of personality congruence is often emphasized in Western psychology, it is not universally important. Suh found that collectivists are less congruent than individualists, and that congruence is less strongly related to subjective well-being among collectivists. Suh et al. (1998) also found that among collectivists, the extent to which one's life accords with the wishes of significant others is more important than the emotions that the person feels in predicting his or her life satisfaction.

By examining between-nation differences in wealth and subjective well-being, researchers have arrived at a more complete understanding of the relation between income and happiness.
Some argue that wealth leads to higher subjective well-being only within the poorest nations. According to this idea, wealth influences subjective well-being when basic needs are in danger of not being met. However, Diener, Diener, and Diener (1995) found that even when levels of basic needs were controlled, income had a significant and moderate effect on national subjective well-being. Thus, people in the wealthiest nations tend to be the happiest. This might be because they possess more material goods, but it also could be because the wealthiest nations experience higher levels of human rights, greater longevity, and more equality.

Because demographic variables have different consequences in different cultures, these correlates can vary in importance. For example, marriage is an important demographic correlate of subjective well-being (Diener, Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000). However, it is unclear whether the benefits of marriage result from the love and companionship that accompany long-term relationships or from the social approval that married couples receive. Diener, Gohm, Suh, and Oishi (2000) found that unmarried individuals who lived together were happier than married or single individuals in individualist cultures (suggesting that in these cultures companionship is more important than social approval), but unmarried partners who lived together were less happy than married or single individuals in collectivist cultures (suggesting that in these cultures social approval is an important benefit of marriage). Thus, cultural norms can change the correlates of subjective well-being.

Interventions

Interventions to increase subjective well-being are important not only because it feels good to be happy but also because happy people tend to volunteer more, have more positive work behavior, and exhibit other desirable characteristics. Because of the roots of the field of subjective well-being in survey research, few direct intervention efforts have been implemented. However, Fordyce (1977, 1983) published several studies in which he evaluated a program designed to boost people's happiness. The program is based on the idea that people's subjective well-being can be increased if they learn to imitate the traits of happy people, characteristics such as being organized, keeping busy, spending more time socializing, developing a positive outlook, and working on a healthy personality. Fordyce found that the program produced increases in happiness compared with a placebo control, as well as compared with participants in conditions receiving only partial information. In a follow-up 9 to 28 months after the study, Fordyce found that there were lasting effects of his intervention.

Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, and Gillham (1995) performed an experimental study with children in which the treatment groups were exposed to optimism training. Through cognitive training and social-problem solving, elementary school children who were at risk for depression were taught to see the bright side of events. After the intervention, the treatment groups were significantly less depressed than the control group, and this effect grew over the period of the study's 2-year follow-up.

Clearly, more efforts to enhance subjective well-being are needed, along with rigorous methods to evaluate these interventions. For example, more diverse dependent variables and measuring instruments would be salutary, as well as explorations of which interventions are most beneficial, and why. The positive benefits of the few existing experiments, however, suggest that programs designed to enhance subjective well-being can be quite effective.

Future Research

In terms of measurement and research methods, many researchers have relied solely on global retrospective self-reports. A series of construct validation studies by Diener and colleagues (e.g., Lucas et al., 1996; Sandvik et al., 1993) illustrated that global self-reports have a degree of validity. However, it is still unclear to what extent individual and cultural differences found in global reports are accurate reflections of differences in on-line experiences or are manifestations of processes related to global ways people see themselves. What is needed is a battery of subjective well-being measures based on online experiences, informant reports, biological measures, and cognitive measures that assess the accessibility of positive events in memory. In addition to better measures, we need many more longitudinal studies in order to assess variables in a temporal order.

In terms of substantive areas, more attention should be paid to developmental processes involving subjective well-being. In particular,
given recent advances in infant/child temperament research (e.g., Goldsmith, 1996; Rothbart & Ahadi, 1995), the link between positive affectivity in infancy and childhood and subjective well-being in adulthood should be explored, not only in terms of stability but also with respect to the mechanisms that operate in maintaining or changing one’s susceptibility to positive stimuli throughout life. Similarly, a longitudinal approach should be taken in an investigation of society and culture. Specifically, the way in which changes in macro systems (e.g., political, economic, and cultural) have an impact on people’s well-being should be examined more carefully to create the happy societies Bentham and others envisioned.

In 1949, Henry Murray and Clyde Kluckhohn claimed that “Aristotle’s assertion that the only rational goal of goals is happiness has never been successfully refuted as far as we know, but, as yet no scientist has ventured to break ground for a psychology of happiness” (p. 13). As demonstrated in this chapter, scientists have now begun the scientific study of happiness. Although the happy person is more likely to be from a wealthy nation and have enough resources to pursue his or her particular goals, characteristics such as a positive outlook, meaningful goals, close social relationships, and a temperament characterized by low worry are very important to high subjective well-being. We look to the day when effective interventions based on scientific findings will provide a readily available way to increase happiness.

APPENDIX

Satisfaction with Life Scale

Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1–7 scale below indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.

7 Strongly agree
6 Agree
5 Slightly agree
4 Neither agree nor disagree
3 Slightly disagree
2 Disagree
1 Strongly disagree

— In most ways my life is close to my ideal
— The conditions of my life are excellent
— I am satisfied with my life
— So far I have gotten the important things I want in life
— If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing

Scoring and Interpretation of the Scale

Add up your answers to the five items and use the following normative information to help in “interpretation.”

5–9 Extremely dissatisfied with your life
10–14 Very dissatisfied with your life
15–19 Slightly dissatisfied with your life
20 About neutral
21–25 Somewhat satisfied with your life
26–30 Very satisfied with your life
31–35 Extremely satisfied with your life

Most Americans score in the 21–25 range. A score above 25 indicates that you are more satisfied than most people. The Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).

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